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Abstract
This research examines how well certain theories of direct democracy explain outcomes
of ballot measures on gay marriage bans. Most theories of direct democracy focus on
the types of issues that are quite dissimilar from gay marriage bans. Therefore these
theories will likely not do a good job of explaining the results of these elections. In
particular I examine the role of campaign spending and elite endorsements in
campaigns for gay marriage ban ballot initiatives. In candidate elections, voters
commonly use heuristics such as party labels and past performance to help them
decide. In most ballot initiative contests voters rely on the information provided by
campaigns in lieu of these heuristics, since these are removed in ballot initiative
contests. Greater campaign expenditures allow each side to get out more information
regarding the proposition, which could be vital in swaying the minds of less informed
voters. Elite endorsements can provide voters with partisan signals that may aid in their
decision-making. Campaign expenditures and elite endorsements have been found to be
important factors in determining which side wins in some ballot initiative elections.
However, social issues such as gay marriage are quite different from the areas normally
covered by ballot initiatives. As a moral issue, gay marriage has low information needs.
Voters do not need to conduct a lot of research to be able to decide their opinion on gay
marriage. Therefore, the effect of heuristics such as campaign expenditures and elite
endorsements may be lower than it normally is in ballot initiative campaigns. My
findings support these hypotheses. I find that campaign expenditures are not
significantly correlated with the vote outcomes of same-sex marriage bans. Survey
experiments also found that being primed with President Obama’s view on same-sex
marriage did not affect most respondents’ opinion on marriage equality.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

Research Question
Voters in the United States are increasingly being confronted with ballot
initiatives regarding social issues. The use of direct democracy is increasing in the states
and many of these ballot initiatives and referenda involve social issues (NCSL 2014a),
such as marriage equality. Gay marriage has become a highly contentious issue over the
past decade. Most voter involvement in the issue is through direct democracy. Since
2000 there have been 37 ballot propositions to either ban or legalize gay marriage at
the state level. However, little scholarly attention has been paid to how voters decide
when voting on this issue. This work helps to fill that void.
In candidate elections, voters commonly use heuristics such as party labels and
past performance to help them decide. These heuristics are removed in ballot initiatives
contests, and therefore, voters rely on the information provided by the ballot initiative
campaigns in lieu of these heuristics. Greater campaign expenditures allow each side to
get out more information regarding the proposition, which could be vital in swaying the
minds of less informed voters. Campaign expenditures and elite endorsements have
been found to be an important factor in which side wins in a ballot initiative election.
However, social issues such as gay marriage are quite different from the issue
areas normally covered by ballot initiatives. Social issues are often referred to as
morality issues or emotive-symbolic policies. The defining characteristics of morality
7

policy are that they “generate conflict of basic moral values, do not lend themselves to
compromise, and are widely salient and technically simple” (Mooney and Schuldt 2008,
199). Emotive symbolic policies "generate emotional support for deeply held values, but
unlike the other [public policy] types... the values sought are essentially noneconomic”
(Smith 1975, 90).
Gay marriage is what Carmines and Stimson (1980, 80) would call an “easy
issue.” “Easy issues” have three characteristics:
“1) The easy issue would be symbolic rather than
technical; 2) It would more likely deal more with policy
ends than means; and 3) It would be an issue long on the
political agenda.”
As an “easy issue,” gay marriage has low information needs. Voters do not need to
conduct a lot of research to be able to decide their opinion on morality issues like gay
marriage. Therefore, the effects of campaign expenditures and elite endorsements may
be lower than they normally are in ballot initiative campaigns. The goal of this work is to
determine how much of an effect campaign expenditures and elite endorsements have
on outcomes of gay marriage ballot initiatives. In this study I compare the “easy” issue
of marriage equality to the “hard” issue of gambling. The differences and similarities
between these issues will be explored in more detail in Chapters 3 and 4.
This study uses a quantitative research design, including multivariate and logit
regression to examine the effects of campaign expenditures, elite endorsements, and
social and political factors on public opinion and the outcomes of gay marriage ban
ballot measures.
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Importance of the Problem
In the 2012 election, there were nearly 200 ballot initiatives in the states
(Initiative and Referendum Institute 2010). The use of direct democracy has increased
greatly over the past couple decades (Initiative and Referendum Institute 2012). Many
of these recent ballot initiatives address social issues. The focus of this project is the
issue of marriage equality, which has often been the subject of ballot initiatives.
However, this work might also be generalizable to other social issues that are
increasingly the target of direct democracy, such as marijuana and abortion.
There are two standard ways that direct democracy occurs in a state. The first is
an initiative, which allows voters to propose a statutory measure or a constitutional
amendment by filing a petition bearing the required number of citizen signatures. The
second is a referendum, which occurs when the legislature refers a proposed or existing
law or statute to voters for their approval or rejection (Matsusaka 2005). Both of these
methods have been used in the issue of gay marriage.
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Figure 1.1. Number of Initiatives/Referenda by Decade
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*Data from the National Conference of State Legislatures Ballot Measure Database

The use of initiative and referenda has greatly increased over the past couple
decades, as can be seen in Figure 1.1. There were over one thousand ballot initiatives in
the last decade and the current decade seems to be on pace to surpass that number
(NCSL 2014a). As can be seen in Table 1.1, social issues make up a significant portion of
ballot measures. There is at least one ballot measure on a social issue in each election
over the last decade. Additionally, the portion of ballot measures devoted to social
issues increased in the later part of the decade. However, there has been little research
regarding how these social issue ballot measures might differ from the ballot measures
concerning “hard” issues, such as governance and tax policies. It is important to
determine how well theories of direct democracy apply to ballot measures concerning
social issues, such as gay rights, abortion rights, and marijuana. The social issue that this
project focuses on is marriage equality.
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Table 1.1. Percent of ballot measures that address social issues, by year.
Year
2000

Percent of ballot measures
regarding social issues
11.4%

2001

2.6%

2002

8.5%

2003

7.4%

2004

20.8%

2005

11.1%

2006

16.4%

2007

9.1%

2008

17.8%

2009

12.5%

2010

7.6%

2011

14.7%

*Data from the National Conference of State Legislatures Ballot Measure Database

The study of gay rights is a relatively new field in academia. For a long time,
scholars were wary of studying gay rights (Cook 1999) and therefore, scholarship in the
area suffered. The field has greatly expanded in recent decades however, now that
scholars are not as afraid of being branded as homosexual (Cook 1999) and as the issue
of gay rights has become more present in current political discussion.
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Early gay rights advocates did not focus on marriage as a goal. Rather, many
early activists viewed marriage as an assimilationist goal. The gay liberation movement,
which stressed the differences between the gay community and the heteronormative
society, dominated until recently (Egan and Sherrill 2005; Chauncey 2004). Instead of
marriage, early activists were far more concerned with issues like police harassment,
education, and employment discrimination. These issues were much more pressing than
marriage for the early gay rights movement. Addressing police harassment was vital
since police often used unfair policing tactics like entrapment when dealing with
homosexuals. The early gay rights movement also focused much of its efforts on
educating society about homosexuality in an attempt to soften public opinion (D’Emilio
1983).
The issue of marriage equality began to slowly come onto the public agenda in
the 1990s. Several same-sex couples took the marriage issue to the courts and they
found their first victory in Hawaii. In 1993, the Hawaii Supreme Court ruled that denying
marriage to same-sex couples without a compelling justification violated the state
constitution’s guarantee of equal protection under the law. In 1996, the Court ruled that
the state had failed to meet the requirement of compelling state interests. These
apparent victories for the gay rights movement were short-lived, however. In response
to the court decisions, Hawaiian voters passed an amendment to the state constitution
in 1998 that allowed the legislature to restrict marriage to heterosexual couples only
(Rosenberg 2008). The federal government also passed the Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA), which was introduced in 1996. DOMA federally defined marriage as only
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between one man and one woman and acknowledged the rights of each state to refuse
to recognize same-sex marriages from other states. It passed overwhelmingly in both
the House and Senate and was quietly signed by President Clinton (Rosenberg 2008).
In 1999 marriage equality won another apparent victory. In Baker v Vermont, the
Vermont Supreme Court ruled that not allowing same-sex couples to marry denied them
the benefits of civil marriage protected under the state constitution. Instead of forcing
same-sex marriage on the state, the Court suggested that a domestic partnership law
would be constitutionally acceptable and the legislature promptly passed a bill to create
civil unions (Rosenberg 2008).
The issue of same-sex marriage really started to gain steam after the U.S.
Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in Lawrence v Texas that ruled laws banning same-sex
sodomy were unconstitutional. While not explicitly about gay marriage, the decision
was seen by many as a prelude to marriage equality (Egan, Persily, and Wallsten 2008).
Indeed, in his dissent, Justice Scalia argued that the ruling left state laws prohibiting
same-sex marriage on “pretty shaky grounds,” since the decision “dismantles the
structure of constitutional law that has permitted a distinction to be made between
heterosexual and homosexual unions” (Lawrence v Texas 2003 Scalia Dissent, 20-21).
The decision sparked an increase in media attention to the issue of gay marriage (Egan,
Persily, and Wallsten 2008; Stoutenborough, Haider-Markel, and Allen 2006; Ura 2009).
Lawrence v Texas was quickly followed by another important court ruling. In
November 2003, Massachusetts became the first state to legalize gay marriage due to
the state’s Supreme Court decision in Goodridge v Department of Public Health. Media
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coverage of gay marriage spiked. Since then, gay marriage has been in the public
spotlight and it has become a major goal for gay rights activist groups (Ball 2012).
After 2003, many in the religious right felt on the defensive on the issue of gay
rights. Gay marriage was already illegal by statute in many states. To prevent state
courts from legalizing gay marriage, as the Massachusetts Supreme Court had, religious
right groups put initiatives on the ballots in many states to include bans on gay marriage
in the state constitution.
Gay marriage continues to be a contested issue. Thirty-one states have passed
laws that prohibit same-sex marriage, with 28 of those being constitutional provisions
that define marriage as between one man and one woman (NCSL 2014). Nearly all of
these were passed using direct democracy. The issue continues to stay in the spotlight.
Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, and Washington1 voted on gay marriage in the November
2012 election. The U.S. Supreme Court recently ruled in Obergefell v Hodges that these
marriage bans violate the Fourteenth Amendment, making same-sex marriage legal in
all states.

In the following chapter, I will explore the relevant literature on voting behavior
in ballot measure campaigns. The existing theories surrounding the effects of heuristics
in ballot initiative campaigns will be examined. In addition, the research regarding the
determinants of the outcome of same-sex marriage bans will also be detailed.

1

The Maine, Maryland, and Washington ballot measures are different from others before it, however,
since they actually seek to legalize, not ban gay marriage.
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Chapter 3 will contain the data analysis for the impact of campaign expenditures
on the outcomes of same-sex marriage bans. I find that campaign expenditures do not
have an effect on the outcome of same-sex marriage bans. Demographic variables did a
much better job than campaign spending in predicting outcomes of same-sex marriage
bans. I also include analysis of the impact of campaign expenditures on ballot initiatives
regarding gambling as a comparison “hard” issue. My analysis indicates that campaign
expenditures do not have an impact on the outcome of gambling measures either.
Chapter 4 details the data analysis for the impact of elite endorsements on opinion on
marriage equality. The results indicate that the effect of elite endorsements on marriage
equality opinion is complex. One survey experiment found no evidence that being
primed with an elite endorsement changed opinion on marriage equality, while the
other found that it did change opinion but only for respondents who disapprove of Pres.
Obama. In Chapter 4 I again used gambling as a comparison “hard” issue and found that
the priming treatment did boost opposition to gambling. Chapter 5 includes concluding
thoughts and implications for further research.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review

There are several forms of direct democracy that can occur in a state. Ballot
measures or propositions are elections in which citizens vote directly on specific laws.
These are the most popular form of direct democracy and the one that this paper
focuses on. Ballot measures vary in how they get on the ballot and whether they
propose a new law or attempt to repeal an existing one. An initiative is a new law that is
proposed by citizens and qualifies for the ballot by the collection of a certain number of
signatures from voters. A petition referendum also qualifies for the ballot by collecting
voter signatures, but is a vote on a law already approved by the legislature. A legislative
referendum is placed on the ballot directly by the legislature. Most states require
constitutional amendments to be approved by popular vote (Matsusaka 2005). Over 70
percent of Americans live in either a state or municipality where some form of direct
democracy is available (Matsusaka 2004).
Most research on direct democracy has focused on how ballot measures affect
public policy (Tolbert and Smith 2006). The conclusion that these studies have come to
is that states that have the initiative and that use it frequently have different policies
than states that do not have the initiative (Tolbert and Smith 2006). States with the
initiative spend and tax less than states without the initiative (Matsusaka 2004). States
that use the initiative frequently are more likely to adopt governance policies, such as
term limits and campaign contribution limits (Tolbert 2003). Initiative states are also
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more responsive to their citizen’s abortion policy preferences (Arceneaux 2002).
In addition to affecting public policy, initiative use also has “spillover effects,”
meaning that it can alter the attitudes and behavior of citizens as well as the strategies
of interest groups and political parties (Tolbert and Smith 2006). Initiative use is linked
to increased voter turnout (Smith and Tolbert 2004; Tolbert et al 2001; Tolbert and
Smith 2005; Tolbert and Bowen 2008). Direct democracy can have an educative effect –
citizens that live in states with more propositions on the ballot are more aware of and
more interested in ballot issues (Donovan et al 2009; Tolbert and Bowen 2008). Certain
ballot measures can have agenda setting and priming effects (Nicholson 2005; Donovan
et al 2008). Initiatives on controversial issues (such as same-sex marriage) can play a
role in shaping the agenda of an election, which in turn shapes how voters judge
candidates (Nicholson 2005). These effects have been found on topics such as abortion
(Nicholson 2005), affirmative action (Nicholson 2005), and gay marriage (Donovan et al
2008).
Donovan et al (2008) found that ballot measures can have effects on presidential
choice since issue salience can be conditioned by ballot measures. In 2004, thirteen
states had same-sex marriage bans on the ballot. Many observers and pundits credit the
presence of these gay marriage bans on the ballot for President Bush’s victory in the
presidential election. These ballot measures created an information environment that
increased the likelihood that some voters used the issue of marriage equality when
evaluating the presidential candidates. The campaigns generated by those ballot
measures increased the salience of gay marriage as an issue for evaluating presidential
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candidates (Donovan et al 2008). Indeed, there is evidence that political organizations
have used this priming effect to their advantage by proposing ballot measures in order
to affect the electoral landscape by mobilizing base supporters (Smith and Tolbert
2004).
Instead of focusing on the effects of direct democracy, this research focuses on
how voters decide how to vote in direct democracy elections. I specifically examine
types of heuristics to determine if heuristics are needed for certain types of direct
democracy issues. Is the voter’s decision-making process different for different types of
issues?

Heuristics
Voters often rely on heuristics, or information shortcuts, to simplify the voting
decisions they must make. Voters use heuristics to compensate for a lack of complete
information about politics (Ferejohn 1990; Popkin 1991; Sniderman et al 1991; Lupia
and McCubbins 2000). Research has shown that voters can use limited information
efficiently to make the same voting decision that they would have made if they had
taken the time to acquire complete information about the measure (Lupia 1994). Lupia
and McCubbins (1998; 2000) argue that reasoned choice does not require full
information. Instead, it simply requires the ability to predict the consequences of
actions. People can use shortcuts/heuristics to dependably figure out what they favor
and oppose politically to simplify the choices they must make (Ferejohn 1990; Popkin
1991; Sniderman et al 1991). Heuristics can be a useful alternative to gathering
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complete information about a candidate or proposition. The use of heuristics can allow
poorly informed voters to emulate the behavior of relatively well-informed voters (Lupia
1994).
In today’s society, lack of access to information is rarely a problem. Political
information is not scarce, but people generally lack the time and energy needed to
make sense of all this information. People choose to disregard most of the information
they could acquire and instead base their decisions on limited information (Iyengar
1990). Voters rely on information shortcuts not because it is impossible to gather the
necessary information, but because there is little incentive to do so (Downs 1957;
Ferejohn 1990; Fiorina 1990). However, this limited information does not need to
prevent people from making reasoned choices. People make effective use of the
information that is available to them by sorting the information that is useful from that
which is not (Lupia and McCubbins 1998).
Lau and Redlawsk (2001) found that most voters use at least one of the following
heuristics: party affiliation, ideology, endorsements, viability, and candidate
appearance. There is evidence that use of heuristics may actually decrease correct
voting for politically unsophisticated voters. However, political sophistication may help a
voter to use heuristics more effectively. Political sophistication brings in knowledge of
the political world, which allows the voter to make better inferences from heuristic cues
(Lau and Redlawsk 2001).
Voters are generally able to use heuristics effectively to choose the candidate
they would have chosen if they had complete information (Lau and Redlawsk 1997; Lau
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2013). However, this becomes more difficult for voters in certain elections, such as
primaries. Voters have a more difficult task in primary elections since these elections are
often low-information, there are often more than two candidates, all candidates are the
same party, and candidates are often more ideologically similar than candidates in
general elections. With fewer heuristics to rely upon and more candidates to decide
between, voters often do not vote “correctly” in primary elections (Lau 2013).
Affect can act as a heuristic – voters can use their likes and dislikes to determine
their policy preferences (Brady and Sniderman 1985; Sniderman et al 1991). Citizens can
rely on their political affect to determine who wants what politically and who lines up
on the same and opposing sides of key issues. This likability heuristic is organized
around how people feel about groups such as liberals and conservatives (Brady and
Sniderman 1985). People can usually accurately estimate the issue positions of strategic
groups in politics. This is accomplished by relying on their political affect, or how much
they like or dislike these groups. Using the likability heuristic, those who do not know a
lot about politics can still figure out the issue positions of strategic groups. Those with
less political information are more likely to rely on this likability heuristic (Sniderman et
al 1991). This likability heuristic is useful to voters assessing elite endorsements. How
much they like or dislike the person or group giving the endorsement will affect how
they use that information. Additionally, whether the voter likes or dislikes the group
that may be targeted by a ballot measure will affect their assessment of that measure,
especially when it involves a traditionally disliked group like gays and lesbians.
Heuristics are not always useful – in certain situations, they can lead citizens
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astray. For example, while political interested citizens are most likely to know their
senator’s vote when she votes with her party, they are also likely to incorrectly identify
their senator’s vote when she votes against her party (Dancey and Sheagley 2012).
Two of the most common heuristics are party label and past performance
(Popkin 1991; Gerber and Phillips 2003). However, this information is not available to
voters in a direct democracy election. Initiatives do not have a party label attached. Nor
can voters make a retrospective evaluation on a ballot initiative the way they might in a
candidate election. Without these heuristics to rely upon, voters may have a more
difficult time voting their preferences and will therefore be more reliant on information
provided during the campaign (Gerber and Phillips 2003), such as campaign
advertisements or elite endorsements. Another difficulty that voters face in direct
democracy elections is that the issues they must vote on are usually complex. Many of
the ballot initiatives that voters face deal with complicated governmental issues or
revenues. This can make it even more difficult for voters to correctly align their
preferences with their vote.
In the absence of heuristics such as party label and past performance, voters in
direct democracy elections must find other heuristics to help them decide how to cast
their vote. Research has found that voters most often rely upon elite endorsements and
campaign advertisements to help them decide how to vote in direct democracy
elections. There is evidence that even with limited information, voters can still make
reasonably informed choices in direct democracy elections (Bowler and Donovan 2001).
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Campaign Expenditures
Campaign advertising can help to subsidize the information costs involved in
direct democracy (Lewkowicz 2006). Much of a campaign’s expenditures are spent on
campaign advertising and so they are often used as a proxy for each other in research.
Greater campaign expenditures allow each side to get out more information regarding
their position on the proposition, which could be vital in swaying the minds of less
informed voters (Magleby 1984; Bowler and Donovan 2001). This is the reason that
money has been called “the single most important factor determining direct legislation
outcomes” (Cronin 1989, 215). Interest groups certainly believe that money can sway
voters – in 2008, ballot measure committees raised more than $813 million (Streb
2011).
Many earlier studies found that campaign spending has unequal effects in direct
democracy elections. Spending by both sides has an effect on votes, but the effect of
opponent spending has often been found to be larger than the effect of proponent
spending. This led researchers to conclude that negative campaigns are more effective
in decreasing support than proponent campaigns are at increasing support for ballot
measures (Banducci 1998; Bowler and Donovan 1994; Bowler and Donovan 1998;
Garrett and Gerber 2001; Magleby 1984; Bowler and Donovan 2001). Campaigns against
a ballot measures are generally attempting to preserve the status quo and therefore
simply need to create enough doubt among voters about the effects of the measure.
Spending money on campaign advertisements detailing the negative consequences of
the measure can often create sufficient concern to prevent the ballot measure from
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passing (Gerber 1999). These studies concluded that proponents of initiatives are
generally unable to obtain passage by simply outspending the opposition; however
opponents of an initiative might be able to virtually guarantee the defeat of an initiative
if they significantly outspend the proponents (Magleby 1984).
However, more recent studies have called these findings into question and argue
that spending by both sides of a campaign have an impact on ballot measures. These
earlier studies did not account for the endogeneity of campaign spending (Stratmann
2006) and also assumed that spending will have a constant, linear effect on outcomes
(de Figueiredo et al 2011). After accounting for the endogeneity of the campaign
spending, Stratmann (2006) finds that advertising by supporters of a measure is as
productive as opposition spending. Campaign spending may be driven partly by the
probability of success. A group sponsoring a measure that is popular might spend less
than it would on a measure that has less popular support. After making allowances for
the diminishing marginal returns of high campaign expenditures, de Figueiredo et al
(2011) found that campaign spending in favor of initiatives has a positive and significant
effect on outcomes. They argue that interest groups can boost the chances of passing an
initiative just as effectively as opponents can spend to stop them. Once a campaign has
spent a million dollars, an extra ten thousand may not have a large impact. However,
ten thousand dollars to a campaign that has only spent a thousand will have more of an
impact. Not every dollar has an equal effect.
Advertising can be an important tool for campaigns to educate voters regarding
propositions. While there are other opportunities to obtain information about ballot
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measures, Burnett (2013) finds that well-funded campaigns are very effective at
informing voters on the pieces of information they choose to emphasize. Campaign
advertisements may also help to inform voters on which political elites support or
oppose the measure, which can also be a helpful heuristic for voters (Karp 1998; Bowler
and Donovan 2001).

Elite Endorsements
When political elites endorse a proposition, it can send a partisan cue to voters.
While a party label might not be on the ballot for propositions, endorsements by
political elites may serve the same function. Endorsements by interest groups may help
to mobilize their members or those who are supportive of their cause (Lewkowicz 2006).
Endorsements are more persuasive when the interest group is perceived as
knowledgeable about the issue (Gerber and Phillips 2003). For example, an
endorsement has more of an effect when the interest group is relevant to the issue. An
endorsement by an environmental group will probably not mean much to voters for an
initiative about education, but the endorsement of a teaching group would be
influential. Additionally, endorsements by fictional interest groups do not influence
voters (Forehand, Gastil, and Smith 2004). Endorsements also have more of an impact
when the voter believes that they and the endorser share common interests (Gerber
and Phillips 2003).
Lupia (1994) finds that knowledge of the position of certain groups can enable
voters to make decisions on a ballot measure similar to that of well-informed voters.
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The endorsement of a group can give relatively uninformed voters the crucial piece of
information they need to emulate the behavior of well-informed voters.
Opposition to (but not support of) a ballot measure by elected officials has a
significant effect on the outcome of the measure (Karp 1998; Paul and Brown 2006).
Elected officials can be a useful cue for voters since elected officials are visible to voters,
which means that voters are more likely to hear information from them. Therefore,
endorsements by elected officials have a greater impact than endorsements from other
types of community leaders, such as business leaders, citizen groups, and minority
leaders (Paul and Brown 2006). There is evidence that voters may value the opinion of
political elites more than that of political parties. Cues from salient political leaders may
be more effective than cues from the major political parties. Voters may see the parties
as too broad and vague (Borges 2008). Nicholson (2012) found that while cues from
party leaders often affected voters’ policy opinions, party cues alone did not have a
similar effect. Additionally, party cues are only helpful for some voters. For moderates,
knowledge of a political party’s endorsement of a ballot measure does not affect their
vote. Knowledge of a party cue has an effect on partisan voters, but not independent
voters (Burnett and McCubbins 2014).
How a voter uses a cue from an elite is conditional on one’s assessment of the
cue-giver (Karp 1998; Burnett and McCubbins 2013). Endorsements from politicians are
more effective for voters who approve of the cue giver’s performance in office. Voters
who disapprove of the politician’s performance are also likely to use the endorsement
as a heuristic. If a political elite that a voter disapproves of endorses a proposition, that
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voter is more likely to vote against the measure (Burnett and McCubbins 2013). Indeed,
out-party cues may have more of an impact than in-party cues. While people may see
their own group as holding varied opinions, they often view out-groups as holding
homogeneous opinions. Partisans may define themselves less as a member of the party
and more in relation to the opposition party (Nicholson 2012).
Paul and Brown (2006) argue that elite cues may be more influential when voters
know little about a ballot measure. However, Burnett and Parry (2014) found that a
governor’s endorsement of a ballot measure only had a significant effect on voter
support for only one of three ballot measures examined. The endorsement of the
governor was only effective for the most high profile ballot measure but not the two
lower profile ballot measures (Burnett and Parry 2014). Nicholson (2011) argues that
“easy” issues, such as same-sex marriage, are likely to be more resistant to the influence
of elite cues. Endorsements should have more of an effect on voters dealing with
complex issues, when voters will need to rely on heuristics more in order to make a
decision. If a policy is more complex and difficult to understand, source cues dominate
policy. However, if a policy is relatively straightforward, policy cues dominate over
source cues. Unless the source cue conveys unexpected information or if it is from a
despised group, participants in Nicholson’s (2011) experiment ignored the source cues
and made their decisions based on policy considerations. When faced with decisions on
“easy” issues, voters are likely to ignore source cues. Party cues only mattered to the
experiment participants when they conveyed unexpected information.
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Morality Politics
While money and endorsements are generally important in elections, especially
for ballot initiatives, there is reason to believe that this might not always be the case.
Not all ballot initiatives are equal. Most of the research on ballot initiatives has been
conducted on initiatives regarding “hard issues,” such as tax policy or governmental
policy change. The factors for the passage of ballot initiatives regarding morality issues
should be very different than the factors affecting the passage of a ballot initiative for a
tax issue.
Morality issues are different than other policy areas and need to be treated as
such. Haider-Markel and Meier (1996; 2003) have offered a good definition of the
characteristics of morality politics. In morality politics at least one side portrays the issue
as one of morality and uses moral arguments. Morality politics have low information
needs since voters do not need to conduct a lot of research to be able to decide their
opinion on morality issues. Morality politics is highly salient and tends to be partisan.
Morality politics offers no incremental solutions, since it is difficult to compromise on
morality (Haider-Markel and Meier 1996; 2003). These characteristics clearly describe
the policy area of gay rights.
Issues such as marriage equality have low information needs. Voters facing ballot
initiatives on gay marriage may not need to rely on campaign advertising and
endorsements to subsidize their information costs and help make their decision on how
to vote. Most Americans already have an opinion regarding gay marriage. In the 2012
ANES survey, only 0.64 percent of respondents said they did not know how they felt
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about gay marriage. This is in contrast to the 23 percent who neither favored nor
opposed legalizing marijuana or the 35 percent who neither favored nor opposed the
TARP program. Therefore, campaign expenditures and elite endorsements should not
have as much of an impact on outcomes of ballot initiatives on gay marriage as in direct
democracy campaigns on other issues.
There is already some evidence to support the argument that voters do not need
to rely on heuristics to decide on the issue of marriage equality. Becker and Scheufele
(2011) found that news media exposure does not significantly influence public attitudes
toward homosexuality. They concluded that other factors, such as religiosity and
demographic variables, are better able to explain the variance in public opinion on
homosexuality.

Public Support for Gay Rights
Demographics
Most of the current research on LGBT issues and public opinion surrounding
these issues has focused on demographic and basic political variables. Variables such as
party identification, ideology, religion, religiosity, gender, education, age, and race have
consistently been found to be correlated with support for gay rights.
Many studies have found that Democratic voters are more likely to support gay
rights (Bramlett 2012; Brewer 2003; Egan and Sherrill 2006; Haider-Markel and Joslyn
2005; Sherkat et al 2011; Winslow and Napier 2012; Lofton and Haider-Markel 2007)
and that states with higher numbers of Democrats in the state legislature (Haider-
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Markel and Meier 1996), states with Democrats controlling many of the state
institutions (Hume 2011), states with higher numbers of registered Democrats (HaiderMarkel and Meier 2003), and states with higher vote shares for the Democratic
Presidential nominee (Haider-Markel and Meier 2003; Salka and Burnett 2012; Wald,
Button, and Rienzo 1996) are more likely to adopt gay rights policies (or less likely to
adopt anti-gay rights policies). For decades the Democratic Party has been more
supportive of gay rights than the Republican Party. The 2004 Democratic Party platform
stated that the Party “support[s] full inclusion of gay and lesbian families in the life of
our nation and seek equal responsibilities, benefits, and protections for these families.”
(DNC 2004) While the 2004 Democratic Party platform argued that marriage should
continue to be defined at the state level, the 2012 platform included support for
marriage equality and the repeal of the Defense of Marriage Act (DNC 2004; DNC 2012).
In contrast, the 2004, 2008, and 2012 Republican Party platforms have included support
for both the Defense of Marriage Act and a federal Constitutional amendment defining
marriage as the union of one man and one woman (RNC 2004; RNC 2008; RNC 2012).
Additionally, individuals who identify as liberal are more likely to support gay rights
(Becker and Scheufele 2011; Bramlett 2012; Brewer 2003; Brown and Henriquez 2011;
Brumbaugh et al 2008; Duncan and Kemmelmeier 2012; Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2005;
Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2008; Lofton and Haider-Markel 2007; Poteat and Mereish
2012; Olson, Cadge, and Harrison 2006; Schwartz 2010; Sherkat et al 2011; Wilcox et al
2007; Woodford et al 2012).
Membership in an Evangelical or Fundamentalist denomination is negatively
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correlated with support for gay rights (Becker and Scheufele 2011; Bramlett 2012;
Loftus 2001; Olson, Cadge, and Harrison 2006; Sherkat et al 2011) as is identifying as a
born-again Christian (Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2008). On an aggregate level, states with
fewer born-again Christians or fewer members of Evangelical or Fundamentalist
denominations are more likely to support gay rights (Egan and Sherrill 2006; HaiderMarkel and Meier 1996; Haider-Markel and Meier 2003; Haider-Markel, Querze, and
Lindaman 2007; Lofton and Haider-Markel 2007; Wald, Button, and Rienzo 1996).
Religiosity is a slightly different variable, usually measured by how frequently the
respondent attends religious services. The more often a person attends church, the
more likely he or she is to be opposed to gay rights (Becker and Scheufele 2011;
Bramlett 2012; Brown and Henriquez 2011; Brumbaugh et al 2008; Duncan and
Kemmelmeier 2012; Egan and Sherrill 2006; Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2005; HaiderMarkel and Joslyn 2008; Lofton and Haider-Markel 2007; Olson, Cadge, & Harrison 2006;
Schwartz 2010; Sherkat et al 2011; Woodford et al 2012).
There are many different gender gaps in individual attitudes toward
homosexuality and gay rights policies. Women are more likely to be supportive of gay
rights policies (Anderson and Fetner 2008; Becker and Scheufele 2011; Brewer 2003;
Brown and Henriquez 2011; Brumbaugh et al 2008; Duncan & Kemmelmeier 2012;
Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2005; Loftus 2001; Moskowitz, Rieger, & Rologg 2010; Olson,
Cadge, & Harrison 2006; Sherkat et al 2011; Wilcox et al 2007). Also, attitudes toward
gay men tend to be more negative than attitudes toward lesbians (Herek 2002;
Moskowitz, Rieger, and Roloff 2010). This is dependent on the sex of the respondent
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and the sex of the target. Heterosexuals tend to hold more negative attitudes toward
gay people of their same sex, with the pattern being stronger for men than women
(Herek 2002; Moskowitz, Rieger, and Roloff 2010).
Individuals who have more education are more likely to be supportive of gay
rights (Anderson and Fetner 2008; Becker and Scheufele 2011; Bramlett 2012; Egan and
Sherrill 2006; Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2005; Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2008; Loftus
2001; Lofton and Haider-Markel 2007; Olson, Cadge, and Harrison 2006; Schwartz 2010;
Wilcox et al 2007). On an aggregate level, states and communities with a more educated
citizenry are more likely to adopt gay rights legislation (Barclay and Fischer 2003;
Haider-Markel and Meier 1996; Haider-Markel and Meier 2003; Haider-Markel, Querze,
and Lindaman 2007; Wald, Button, and Rienzo 1996).
Furthermore, younger individuals are more likely to support gay rights (Anderson
and Fetner 2008; Bramlett 2012; Brumbaugh et al 2008; Egan and Sherrill 2006; HaiderMarkel and Joslyn 2005; Sherkat et al 2011; Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2008; Olson,
Cadge, and Harrison 2006; Schwartz 2010). However, favorable opinion on
homosexuality has been increasing over time within all birth cohorts (Andersen and
Fetner 2008). Lewis and Edwards (2011) found that disapproval of homosexuality
increased within cohorts during the 1980s (possibly due to the AIDS crisis), which more
than offset the increases in public tolerance due to cohort turnover. They also found
that disapproval of homosexuality decreased sharply for cohorts in the early 1990s,
which compounded the effect of cohort replacement.
There are also racial differences in support for homosexuality and gay rights.
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Blacks are more likely than whites to believe that homosexuality is wrong (Brumbaugh
et al 2008; Lewis 2003; Loftus 2001). Even after controlling for religious, educational,
age, and gender differences, these differences remain although they are smaller. Blacks
are also more likely to oppose marriage equality (Brumbaugh et al 2008; Haider-Markel
and Joslyn 205; Sherkat et al 2011; Woodford et al 2012). However, those racial
differences disappear when looking at attitudes towards employment discrimination
protection (Lewis 2003; Loftus 2001). This suggests that, while African-Americans may
not approve of homosexuality, they also do not approve of discriminating on that basis.

Worldview
Attitudes on homosexuality and gay rights are likely structured by the larger
worldview that an individual holds. Worldviews such as authoritarianism (Hetherington
and Weiler 2009; Winslow and Napier 2012), moral traditionalism (Brewer 2003; Brewer
2008; Callahan and Vescio 2011; Haider-Markel and Meier 2003; Olson, Cadge, and
Harrison 2006; Wilcox et al 2007) and egalitarianism (Brewer 2008; Wilcox et al 2007)
have been found to be significantly correlated with opinion on homosexuality and gay
rights.
Religion and religiosity are likely related to gay rights policies and attitudes
because of the traditional attitudes on morality that some conservative denominations
teach. Individuals who hold more traditional attitudes on family values are more likely
to hold negative attitudes on gay rights policies (Haider-Markel & Meier 2003; Olson,
Cadge, & Harrison 2006; Callahan & Vescio 2011; Brewer 2003). However, Brewer
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(2008) finds evidence that this relationship is diminishing. The relationship between
moral traditionalism and opinion on antidiscrimination and gays in the military was
weaker in 2004 than it had been in 1992 (Brewer 2008).
I extended Brewer’s analysis to determine if this relationship is continuing to
weaken. As shown in Table 2.1, this trend appears to have continued. Examining data
from 2008 shows no statistically significant relationship between moral traditionalism
and support for antidiscrimination laws or gays in the military when controlling for other
factors. However, moral traditionalism still has a significant effect on support for
marriage equality.
In Brewer’s research and my extension of it, the dependent variables are how
the respondent answered the following questions:


“Do you favor or oppose laws to protect homosexuals against job
discrimination?” Respondents answered on five-point scale from favor
strongly to oppose strongly.



“Do you think homosexuals should be allowed to serve in the United
States Armed Forces or don’t you think so?” Respondents had five
options, ranging from feel strong should be allowed to feel strongly
should not be allowed.



“Should same-sex couples be allowed to marry, or do you think
they should not be allowed to marry?” Respondents were given
three options from should be allowed to should not be allowed,
with a civil unions option in the middle.
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The moral traditionalism and egalitarianism variables are averages of the
responses to questions intended to measure the respective worldviews.2 Also included
in the analysis were the thermometer ratings for gay and lesbians, which is a scale from
1-100; a seven-point scale for partisanship; a seven-point scale for ideology; religiosity, a
scale that ranges from attendance at a religious service every week to never attending;
a three-point scale which measures to what extent the respondent believes the Bible is
the word of God; as well as gender, race, age, education, and household income. OLS
regression was used.

2

The following questions measure egalitarianism. Responses were coded from (1) strong disagree to (5)
strongly agree. Questions marked with an * were reverse coded. Reliability = .66
 “Our society should do whatever is necessary to make sure that everyone has an equal
opportunity to succeed.”
 “We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country.” *
 “One of the big problem in this country is that we don’t give everyone an equal change.”
 “This country would be better off if we worried less about how equal people are.” *
 “It is not really that big a problem if some people have more of a chance in life than others.” *
 “If people were treated more equally in this country we would have many fewer options.”
The following questions measure moral traditionalism. Responses were coded from (1) strongly disagree
to (5) strongly agree. Questions marked with an * were reverse coded. Reliability = .55
 “The world is always changing and we should adjust our view of moral behavior to those
changes.” *
 “The newer lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown of our society.”
 “We should be more tolerant of people who choose to live according to their own moral
standards, even if they are very different from our own.” *
 “This country would have many fewer problems if there were more emphasis on traditional
family ties.”
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Table 2.1. Influences on support for anti-discrimination laws, gays in the military, and
gay marriage, 2008
Anti-Discrimination Gays in the
Laws
Military

Gay Marriage

Independent
Variable

OLS Coefficients
(Standard Error)

OLS Coefficients
(Standard Error)

OLS Coefficients
(Standard Error)

Feelings toward
gay men and
lesbians
Party identification

-.017***
(.002)

-.017***
(.002)

-.009***
(.001)

.032
(.029)

-.027
(.028)

-.005
(.014)

Ideology

.067
(.04)

.116**
(.039)

.042*
(.020)

Bible should be
taken literally

-.178*
(.089)

-.056
(.085)

-.215***
(.044)

Egalitarianism

.133*
(.067)

.142*
(.065)

.054
(.033)

Moral
traditionalism

-.117
(.064)

-.100
(.061)

-.166***
(.031)

Religiosity

-.043
(.045)

-.094
(.043)

-.166***
(.031)

N=854

N=852

N=841

*p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001
Source: American National Election Studies, 2008.
Note: The model also included controls for gender, race, age, education, and household income.

The results of my extension are detailed in Table 2.1. Moral traditionalism is
significantly correlated with opinion on gay marriage, but not with opinion on the issues
of gays in the military or anti-discrimination laws. For every one point increase in the
five-point moral traditionalism scale, support for gay marriage on a three-point scale
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drops by nearly .2 points. Egalitarianism is a significant factor in support for both antidiscrimination laws and gays in the military (but not marriage), showing that
respondents who value equality are more supportive of both policies. While most of the
religious variables are not correlated with opinion on anti-discrimination laws and gays
in the military (with the exception for taking the Bible literally and support of antidiscrimination laws), the religious variables remain highly significant in predicting
opinion on marriage equality. This is likely for the same reason that moral traditionalism
continues to have such a significant effect on opinion on marriage equality. Marriage is a
mostly religious and moral issue in America. Voters who are more religious and believe
more strongly in traditional moral values have more of a problem with changes
happening to an institution that they see as religious. In all three policy areas, feelings
toward gay men and lesbians are the most significant predictor of opinion on gay rights
policies, with more positive feelings leading to increased support for each policy.
Additional research has shown that an individual’s tendency toward
authoritarianism also has an impact on attitudes regarding marriage equality. People
who score high in authoritarianism tend to view the world in concrete, black and white
terms. They view the social order as fragile and under attack and therefore tend to feel
negatively about, behave aggressively toward, and be intolerant of those whom they
perceive violate time-honored norms or fail to adhere to established social conventions.
Authoritarians are more likely to be opposed to homosexuality and gay rights
(Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Winslow and Napier 2012) and to be conservative on
cultural issues more generally (Cizmar et al 2014).
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Contact Theory
Contact theory was developed by Allport in 1954 and posits that contact with
members of other groups will lead to less prejudice towards those groups. He argued
that “prejudice may be reduced by equal status contact between majority and minority
groups in the pursuit of common goals” (Allport 1954). Not all contact is equal though.
Casual contact does not dispel prejudice; it may actually increase it. Casual contact is
superficial and people will often overlook the casual contacts that defy the stereotypes
they hold about a certain group and instead focus on the ones that confirm those
stereotypes. Contact that leads to the perception of common interests between
members of different groups will be more powerful than casual contact (Allport 1954).
Contact theory has often been successfully applied research about attitudes
toward gays and lesbians. The argument is that familiarity and personal contact with gay
men and lesbians will lead individuals to be more supportive of gay rights. Knowing
someone who is gay is correlated with increased support for gay rights (Brewer 2008;
Brown and Henriquez 2011; Haider-Markel & Joslyn 2008; Hans et al 2012; Dyck &
Pearson-Merkowitz 2014), but the strength of the relationship does matter (Becker and
Scheufele 2011). Casual contact does not have the same impact as a closer, more
meaningful relationship.
There is evidence that contact with gays and lesbians does not change opinion
for the religious. Bramlett (2012) found that while there was a contact effect for some
denominations, casual contact with someone who is gay does not change opinion on
same-sex marriage for white evangelical Protestants or black Protestants. There is also
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evidence that the views of strong Republicans are not affected by contact with gays and
lesbians. Dyck & Pearson-Merkowitz (2014) found a contact effect regarding opinion on
a federal same-sex marriage ban among strong Democrats, but no statistically
significant effect for strong Republicans.
There is a potential problem with endogeneity: contact with gays and lesbians is
often not random. There is the possibility that gays and lesbians will be more likely to
reveal their sexual orientation to those who are already predisposed to be supportive of
gay rights. Burnett and King (2015) addressed this issue by using a matching technique
to create control and treatment groups that have the same propensity to know
someone who is gay or lesbian. Their analysis found some support for the hypothesis
that simply knowing someone who is gay or lesbian has an effect on opinion on samesex marriage, even after controlling for the endogeneity issue.

Attribution Theory
There is also evidence that beliefs about the origins of homosexuality might
impact opinion on gay marriage. According to attribution theory, individuals develop
causal theories to explain the world around them. Whether behavior is seen as
controllable has an impact; people who are observed to have caused their stigma will be
evaluated more negatively than those who are stigmatized as a consequence of
misfortune or the actions of others (Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2008; Lewis 2009).
Individuals who believe that homosexuality is biological and therefore uncontrollable
are more supportive of homosexuality and gay rights, while those who attribute
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homosexuality to choice are more likely to be opposed to homosexuality and gay rights
(Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2005; Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2008; Hans et al 2012; Lewis
2009; Lofton and Haider-Markel 2007; Woodford et al 2012).
However, there is a potential problem with attribution theory regarding
causality. Attributions both arise from and reinforce ideological beliefs. For example,
Lewis (2009) found evidence that value judgments about homosexuality drive
attributions, not the other way around.

Hypotheses
Based on a review of the literature, I have two main hypotheses. The first
involves the relationship between campaign spending and vote totals in favor of gay
marriage bans. Since gay marriage is an “easy issue” and most voters already have an
opinion on the issue, they will not need to rely on campaign advertising to obtain
information on the issue. More advertising and higher spending by each side should not
impact how voters decide on the issue since they have already decided and do not need
the information that the campaigns will provide. Therefore,
H1= There will be no relationship between campaign
spending and vote totals in favor of gay marriage bans.

The second hypothesis involves the relationship between elite endorsements
and vote totals in favor of gay marriage bans. Again, since gay marriage is an “easy
issue,” voters will not need to rely on endorsements by political elites and interest
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groups for information on how to vote on the issue. Voters will not need the cue that
elite endorsements provide to decide how to vote on gay marriage bans. Therefore,
H2= There will be no relationship between elite
endorsements and opinion on same-sex marriage.

Rather, outcomes of gay marriage bans should be correlated with variables that
are more demographic and individual in nature. Variables such as party identification,
religion, and educational levels have all been found to impact support of gay rights
issues. Public opinion has become increasingly supportive of gay marriage over time, so
the year in which the ballot initiative was voted on should also be significant. Therefore,
H3= Vote totals in favor of gay marriage bans will be
correlated social and political variables.
Specifically,
H3a= Vote totals in favor of gay marriage bans will be
negatively correlated with the percentage of Democratic
voters in a state.
H3b= Vote totals in favor of gay marriage bans will be
negatively correlated with the educational levels in a state.
H3c= Vote totals in favor of gay marriage bans will be
negatively correlated with the year in which the ban was
voted on.
H3d= Vote totals in favor of gay marriage bans will be
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positively correlated with the size of Evangelical
denominations.

Conclusion
When faced with ballot initiatives, most voters rely heavily on heuristics to help
them decide how to vote. The two types of heuristics that are most useful to direct
democracy voters are campaign advertisements and elite endorsements. Campaign
advertisements are one of the biggest expenses in a campaign and it is therefore
generally helpful to examine campaign expenditures. Numerous studies have found that
campaign expenditures have a significant impact on the outcomes of direct democracy
elections. Endorsements from political elites can also help voters to decide on ballot
initiatives. Multiple studies have found that endorsements have an impact on the
outcomes of direct democracy issues. However, there has been an absence of literature
examining how ballot initiatives on morality issues might differ from the standard issues
covered by direct democracy. It is precisely this gap in the literature that this work
addresses. Morality issues have much lower information needs than the types of issues
that are usually the subject of direct democracy. Therefore, heuristics such as campaign
advertising and elite endorsements will likely not be as important. The types of variables
that are significant for gay and lesbian issues, especially marriage equality, have been
well-documented in the past decade. Support for gay rights issues is usually correlated
with party identification, ideology, religion, religiosity, race, gender, education, and age.
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Chapter 3: Campaign Expenditures

This chapter focuses on the effects of campaign spending on same-sex marriage
bans and gambling measures. Conventional wisdom assumes that money has a huge
influence in politics. The role of money in elections is a continuing controversy.
Opponents of direct democracy often cite the influence of money as a reason to limit or
disallow direct democracy. They fear that direct democracy will (or already has) become
another tool of special interests that will be able to buy whatever policy they would like
(Magelby 1984). Instead of opening up democracy to ordinary citizens, they argue that
the ballot initiative process has become so costly that it is mostly used by wealthy
special interests rather than citizen groups.
A lot of money is spent on ballot measures every year. In 2014, nearly $500
million was contributed to ballot measure campaigns and almost $1 trillion was
contributed in 2012 (National Institute on Money in State Politics). This is not as much
as the $3.5 trillion contributed to candidates in the 2014 elections or the $4.5 trillion in
2012. But it is still an incredibly large amount of money. Obviously many contributors
expect that this money will have an impact on the election.
Research shows that campaign spending does have a significant effect on the
outcomes of ballot initiative elections (Banducci 1998; Bowler and Donovan 1994;
Bowler and Donovan 1998; de Figueiredo et al 2011; Garrett and Gerber 2001; Magleby
1984). Voters in direct democracy elections do not have access to many of the
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information shortcuts that are so helpful in subsidizing information costs when voting
on candidates. Campaign spending can help minimize the information costs required by
voters in direct democracy elections (Lewkowicz 2006).
However, since morality issues such as gay marriage have low information
needs, I argue that campaign spending will not be as important for these types of ballot
initiatives. For an issue such as marriage equality, voters do not need the information
that can be provided with campaign funds to help them decide how to vote. Indeed, my
results indicate that campaign spending does not have a significant effect on outcomes
of gay marriage ban votes. Instead, demographic variables do a much better job of
explaining vote outcomes on gay marriage bans. By comparison, gambling measures are
more typical “hard” issues where campaign spending can influence the election
outcome. However, my evidence does not support that hypothesis.
In this chapter I will use both multivariate and logit regression to examine the
effects of campaigns expenditures as well as social and political factors on the outcomes
of gay marriage ban ballot measures.

Methods and Data
The first hypothesis is that there will be no relationship between campaign
spending and vote totals in favor of gay marriage bans. To test this hypothesis, I
examine state election results on gay marriage ban ballot measures. I use OLS regression
with bootstrapped standard errors in order to obtain more reliable results. The
dependent variable measures the percent voting in favor of a same-sex marriage ballot
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initiative in each state that has had such a measure on the ballot. Many states have
voted on this issue in the past two decades. Until 2012, all of these bans had been
successful except for Arizona in 2006 (although Arizona did subsequently pass a samesex marriage ban in 2008). Some states are included in the analysis twice if the state
voted on the issue more than once.

Table 3.1. State DOMA ballot measures
Year

Number

States

1998

2

Alaska, Hawaii

2000

3

California, Nebraska, Nevada

2002

1

Nevada

2004

13

Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri,
Mississippi, Montana, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Utah

2005

2

Kansas, Texas

2006

9

Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia, Wisconsin

2008

3

Arizona, California, Florida

2009

1

Maine

2012

2

North Carolina, Minnesota3

3

Three additional states (Maine, Maryland, and Washington) also voted on the issue of marriage equality
in 2012. However, the vote in these states was different from other states since the ballot initiative in
these states was to legalize same-sex marriage, not to ban it. These states were included in the analysis
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The main independent variable for this analysis is based on the amount of
campaign money spent by supporters and opponents. Campaign expenditures were
collected by The Institute on Money in State Politics (The National Institute on Money in
State Politics 2005; O’Connell 2006; Moore 2007; Quist 2009; Evilsizer 2009). Data was
only available for 2004 and after, therefore the states that voted on the issue prior to
2004 were not included in the analysis. The main independent variable is a ratio of the
amount of money spent by supporters of the ban to the amount of money spent by the
opposition. If the ratio is equal to 1, then the spending is equal on both sides; if the ratio
is greater than 1, then supporters spent more; if less than 1, then the opponents
outspent the supporters.4 This measure is preferable to using raw spending data
because it accounts for the fact that spending by one side may impact spending by the
other side. This measure also controls for variation in population between states so that
states with higher populations will not necessarily have high ratios. The conventional
wisdom is that the side that spends the most money in a ballot initiative campaign will
sway voters to vote with that side. My hypothesis is that campaign expenditures will
have no effect on outcomes of gay marriage ban campaigns. A complete list of the ratios
for all states can be found in the appendix.
A few control variables were also included in the analysis, including partisanship,
educational levels, religiosity, and religion. Previous studies (Haider-Markel & Meier
1996) use the partisanship of the state legislature as a control variable. Since this study

but they were reverse coded.
4 There are two cases in which the opposition spent nothing. This poses a problem when dealing with
ratios. In order to avoid having missing data, the amount spent by the opposition was changed from $0 to
$1, thus providing a ratio that could be used in the analysis.
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focuses more on votes by the electorate, I use a variable that measures the percentage
of the public that identifies with the Democratic Party. This varies from 23 percent in
Utah to nearly 51 percent in Maryland. Since individuals who identify as Democrats are
more likely to hold more tolerant views towards homosexuality and gay rights (Bramlett
2012; Brewer 2003; Egan and Sherrill 2006; Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2005; Sherkat et al
2011; Winslow and Napier 2012; Lofton and Haider-Markel 2007), it is expected that the
percentage of Democrats in a state will have a negative relationship with same-sex
marriage ban votes.
Another control variable is educational levels in the state. Data for this variable
came from the 2004 American Community Survey. The educational level data measures
the percentage of the population 25 years and over who have a bachelor’s degree or
higher. This varies from 18 percent in Arkansas to 34.5 percent in Maryland. Previous
studies have found that communities with a more educated citizenry are more likely to
adopt gay rights legislation (Barclay and Fischer 2003; Haider-Markel and Meier 1996;
Haider-Markel and Meier 2003; Haider-Markel, Querze, and Lindaman 2007; Wald,
Button, and Rienzo 1996). A negative relationship is expected between education levels
and voting to ban same-sex marriage.
There are two variables to control for religion and religiosity. The first was
collected from the Association of Religion Data Archives and measures the rates of
adherence for Evangelical denominations as a percent of the population in each state in
2000. This varies from 2 percent in Utah to 42 percent in Alabama. An additional
variable measures the percent of citizens in each state in 2008 that respond that religion
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is very important to their life. This varies from 48 percent in Maine to 85 percent in
Mississippi. Electorates with more members of Evangelical or Fundamentalist
denominations have been found to be more opposed to gay rights laws (Haider-Markel
& Meier 1996; Haider-Markel and Meier 2003; Haider-Markel, Querze, and Lindaman
2007; Egan and Sherrill 2006; Lofton an Haider-Markel 2007; Wald, Button & Rienzo
1996). The 2004 Election Panel Study found that 65 percent of Evangelicals oppose gay
marriage, compared to 38 percent of all Americans (Campbell & Monson 2007).
Individuals who attend church more regularly are more likely to be opposed to gay
rights (Becker and Scheufele 2011; Bramlett 2012; Brown and Henriquez 2011;
Brumbaugh et al 2008; Duncan and Kemmelmeier 2012; Egan and Sherrill 2006; HaiderMarkel and Joslyn 2005; Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2008; Lofton and Haider-Markel
2007; Olson, Cadge, & Harrison 2006; Schwartz 2010; Sherkat et al 2011; Woodford et al
2012). Therefore I would expect both evangelical denominations and religiosity to have
a positive relationship with votes on same-sex marriage bans.
A variable that controls for the year in which the gay marriage was voted on is
also included. As public opinion is becoming more accepting of homosexuality, gay
marriage bans continue to pass by smaller margins every year. Finally, in 2012 a gay
marriage ban actually failed in Minnesota. A May 2013 Gallup poll found that 53 percent
of respondents favor legalizing same-sex marriage, compared with 44 percent in 2010
and 27 percent in 1996 (Gallup 2013). The year of the election should be negatively
associated with voting to ban same-sex marriage.
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Results
The results are detailed in Table 3.25. The results show that campaign
expenditures do not have an effect on voter support for same-sex marriage bans, thus
confirming H1. Previous research generally shows that campaign expenditures have an
impact on the outcomes of ballot initiatives. These results indicate that the issue of
same-sex marriage might be different than the types of issues previously analyzed when
it comes to the effect of money on direct democracy elections.
Several of the control variables were significant predictors of voting behavior as
expected. Vote totals in favor of a same-sex marriage ban were larger in states with a
lower percentage of Democrats and with more religious residents. In addition, the year
in which the ban was voted on was significant, indicating that votes in favor of same-sex
marriage bans are decreasing over time as public opinion becomes more accepting of
gay rights. Voter support for gay marriage bans drops by 1.5 percentage points each
year during the period examined, on average. However, education levels in the state
were not significantly related to initiatives banning gay marriage. There is a decrease in
yes votes for a gay marriage ban by .34 percentage points for every one percentage
point increase of Democrats in a state. The percentage of evangelicals and religiosity
had similar effects to one another. For each percentage point increase in evangelicals
and those responding that religion is important to them, there was a .42 percentage

5

A model was also specified using the log of the raw spending figures, rather than a ratio. Campaign
expenditures were not significantly related to voter support for same-sex marriage bans in this model as
well. While the year of the election was the only control variable significantly correlated with spending in
favor of the ban, spending against the ban was significantly correlated with percent of evangelicals and
with the partisanship and religiosity of the state’s citizens. Results are detailed in Appendix Table A.2.

49

point and .48 percentage point increase, respectively, in voter support for gay marriage
bans.

Table 3.2. Multiple regression on voter support for same-sex marriage bans, 20002012
Independent Variables

OLS Coefficient
(Bootstrap Standard Error)

Ratio of Money Spent by Supporters to
Money Spent by Opposition

.00001
(.051)

Education Levels

-.209
(.395)

Percent Democrats

-.340*
(.135)

Percent Evangelical

.422*
(.191)

Religiosity

.483*
(.146)

Year of Election

-1.450***
(.240)

Constant

49.949***
(15.578)

N
R2

32
.85

*p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001

A couple of states are outliers in this analysis – Utah and Arkansas. A regression
was also run without these two states to see if the results differed. The results were
slightly altered without these outliers, but not drastically. The main differences between
the two regressions is that religiosity and the percent of evangelicals in the state were
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slightly statistically significant with the inclusion of these two states and are slightly
statistically insignificant when they are excluded. The impact of campaign spending is
still insignificant when both states are excluded from the analysis. The full results are
detailed in Appendix Table A.3.
This analysis suggests that campaign expenditures do not have a significant
impact on the outcomes of same-sex marriage ballot measures. While previous research
indicates that money usually has an impact on ballot initiative outcomes, same-sex
marriage bans do not have the same information requirements that the majority of
ballot initiatives have. Morality issues such as same-sex marriage generally have very
low information needs. For most types of ballot initiatives, campaign expenditures are
an important factor determining the success or failure of the measure. These data show
that the issue of same-sex marriage may be a different case and that campaign
expenditures do not have a significant impact on same-sex marriage ban outcomes.
Rather than campaign expenditures, the most important factors for determining the
vote outcome for same-sex marriage bans were demographic variables and moral
attitudes, which have been found to be significant in numerous previous studies. This
confirms H3 which predicted that demographic variables would be more important in
predicting outcomes for same-sex marriage ban campaigns than campaign
expenditures.
Examining exit poll data is another way to look at the effect of campaign
expenditures. Exit poll data from several states that have voted on same-sex marriage
bans can help us see if there are any major differences in the variables that affect

51

voters’ decisions in states that differ in campaign expenditures. The National Election
Pool Exit Polls for 2004, 2006, and 2008 were used for the following analysis. I have
divided the elections into those in which the ratio of spending by proponents of the ban
to opponents was low (Wisconsin and Virginia), moderate (California, Florida, Arizona in
2006, Oregon, and Kentucky), or high (Ohio, Tennessee, Michigan, Arizona in 2008, and
Georgia). Unfortunately, exit poll data is not available for every state election in which a
same-sex marriage ban was present, but the data can still help to determine if there are
significant differences in the voters’ choices in elections where the campaign
expenditures differed.
In this analysis, the dependent variable is whether the exit poll respondent voted
for the gay marriage ban in that state. Independent variables were included that
measure the sex, age, and educational level of the respondent. Educational level is a
five-category variable and the age variable was divided into nine categories. A threecategory variable measuring partisanship was also included, as well as a variable
measuring religiosity. The religiosity variable measured how often the respondent
attends religious services and was divided into five categories ranging from “Never” to
“More than once a week.” Not every question was included in the exit poll in every
state, so variables measuring education and religiosity are missing for some of the
states.
Looking at Tables 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5, we can see there are only slight changes in
which variables are associated with support for a ban on gay marriage in each election.
In all elections that were examined, more religious, Republican, and less educated
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voters were more likely to vote in favor of banning same-sex marriage (except for the
strange case of Arizona in 2008 in which no variables were found to be significant). In
general, party identification and religiosity have the strongest relationship with voter
support for a ban on same-sex marriage. Sex is found to be significant in several states,
but not in others. However, this does not appear to be a pattern related to campaign
spending. Similarly, age is significant in some states, but not others. However, there is
no discernible pattern here either – some of the elections in which it is significant are
moderate ratio elections and others are high ratio elections, but there are other
elections in each category in which age was not significant. For the most part, the same
demographic variables were important in determining how people voted amongst all
the states included in this analysis. Even in states where campaign spending on the
same-sex marriage ban was drastically different, these same demographic variables
were important in explaining voting behavior.
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Table 3.3. Logit regression on same-sex marriage ban votes in elections with a low
ratio of spending by proponents to opponents.

Variable
Sex
Age
Party ID
Religiosity
Education
Constant

Wisconsin
(ratio = .150)
Logit Coefficient
(Standard Error)
-.404
(.213)
.090
(.048)
1.257***
(.128)
.705***
(.096)
-.398***
(.101)
1.474
(.766)
N=620
Pseudo R2= .32

Virginia
(ratio = .268)
% change Logit Coefficient
(Standard Error)
-.301*
(.147)
.067
(.035)
251.4%
1.359***
(.090)
102.3%
.544***
(.056)
-32.8%
-.604***
(.068)
1.475***
(.463)
N=1237
Pseudo R2= .31

% change
-26.0%

289.2%
72.4%
-45.3%

*p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001
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Table 3.4. Logit regression on same-sex marriage ban votes in elections with a
moderate ratio of spending by proponents to opponents.

Variable

Sex
Age
Party ID
Religiosity
Education
Constant

Variable
Sex
Age
Party ID
Religiosity
Education
Constant

California
(ratio=.887)
Logit
% change
Coefficient
(Standard
Error)
-.366
(.247)
.068
(.052)
1.105***
202.0%
(.152)
1.020***
177.2%
(.108)
-.512***
-40.1%
(.116)
3.433***
(.785)
N=493
Pseudo R2= .35
Oregon
(ratio=.830)
Logit Coefficient
(Standard Error)
-.223
(.157)
.124***
(.034)
1.319***
(.102)
--.412***
(.074)
-1.370**
(.450)
N=909
Pseudo R2= .21

Florida
(ratio=.371)
Logit
% change
Coefficient
(Standard
Error)
-.049
(.081)
.065***
6.7%
(.017)
.783***
118.7%
(.048)
--

Arizona06
(ratio=.547)
Logit
% change
Coefficient
(Standard
Error)
-.132
(.098)
.068**
7.0%
(.022)
.980***
116.4%
(.058)
--

-.352***
-29.7%
(.039)
-.170
(.219)
N=2979
Pseudo R2= .09

-.469***
-37.5%
(.047)
-.385
(.284)
N=2130
Pseudo R2= .15

Kentucky
(ratio=.385)
% change Logit Coefficient
(Standard Error)
-.600***
(.164)
13.2%
.052
(.037)
273.8%
.625***
(.089)
.500***
(.065)
-33.8%
--

% change
-45.1%

86.8%
64.9%

1.845***
(.443)
N=904
Pseudo R2= .12

*p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001
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Table 3.5. Logit regression on same-sex marriage ban votes in elections with a high
ratio of spending by proponents to opponents.

Variable

Sex
Age
Party ID
Religiosity
Education
Constant

Variable
Sex
Age
Party ID
Religiosity
Education
Constant

Ohio
(ratio=1.276)
Logit
% change
Coefficient
(Standard
Error)
-.190
(.119)
.083**
8.7%
(.028)
.933***
154.0%
(.071)
.478***
61.2%
(.049)
-.454***
-36.5%
(.056)
1.468***
(.378)
N=1569
Pseudo R2= .19
Arizona08
(ratio=9.433)
Logit Coefficient
(Standard Error)
-.19
(.132)
.002
(.027)
-.074
(.076)
--.119
(.063)
-.338
(.370)
N=978
Pseudo R2= .004

Tennessee
(ratio=1.884)
Logit
% change
Coefficient
(Standard
Error)
.039
(.131)
.019
(.031)
.822***
127.5%
(.080)
.616***
85.1%
(.050)
-.645***
-47.5%
(.062)
3.599***
(.423)
N=1954
Pseudo R2= .20

Georgia
(ratio=n/a)
% change Logit Coefficient
(Standard Error)
-.425**
(.140)
.109**
(.036)
.658***
(.077)
.660***
(.057)
--

Michigan
(ratio=2.260)
Logit
% change
Coefficient
(Standard
Error)
-.351***
-29.6%
(.107)
.038
(.023)
.845***
132.7%
(.064)
.495***
64.0%
(.042)
-.322***
-27.5%
(.050)
1.673***
(.326)
N=1862
Pseudo R2= .16

% change
-34.6%
11.5%
93.2%
93.4%
--

1.733***
(.382)
N=1334
Pseudo R2= .17

*p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001
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In states with different levels of spending, the predicted probability of the
average voter voting for the same-sex marriage ban is fairly similar. The predicted
probability of the average voter in low-ratio Wisconsin voting for the same-sex marriage
ban is 55 percent, while the predicted probability for the average voter in high-ratio
Michigan to do the same is 61 percent, which is within the 95 percent confidence
interval. Even though in each state, the side that spent the most was drastically
different, the probability of the average voter making the same choice is quite similar.
There is evidence that large amounts of spending by one side might not have had the
intended effect. Montana had one of the lowest amounts of total supporter spending
and the predicted probability of the average voter voting in favor of the same-sex
marriage ban is 67 percent. In contrast, Arizona in 2008 had one of the highest amounts
of supporter spending and the predicted probability of the average voter voting yes is
40 percent.
A multilevel logit regression was also run using the exit poll data. This allows us
to directly test the impact of the campaign spending measure for a sample of states. Exit
polls were not available for every state examined in the OLS regression model in Table
3.2. This data includes exit polls from elections that including a same-sex marriage ban
ballot measure in Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio,
Oregon, Tennessee, Virginia, and Wisconsin. The multilevel results are detailed in Table
3.6. An individual’s sex, age, partisanship, religiosity, and education all had a statistically
significant effect on how the respondent voted on the state’s same-sex marriage ban.
The relationship between each of these variables and support for a ban on same-sex
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marriage is in the expected direction. Campaign expenditures in each state did not have
a statistically significant effect on the respondent’s vote.

Table 3.6. Multilevel logit regression on same-sex marriage ban votes
Independent Variables

Logit Coefficient
(Standard Error)

State
Factors

Ratio of Money Spent by Supporters to
Money Spent by Opposition

.279
(.167)

Individual
Factors

Sex

-.239***
(.057)

Age

.052***
(.013)

Party ID

.995***
(.035)

Religiosity

.570***
(.023)

Education

-.482***
(.027)

Constant

-1.711***
(.278)

N

7735

*p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001

From this analysis, it appears that campaign expenditures do not have an effect
on the outcome of same-sex marriage bans. If this is the case, then then why do
organizations spend so much money campaigning on the issue? Whether the goal of
supporters and opponents in these campaigns is to change minds or to increase turnout,
the ultimate goal is to influence the outcome of the election. It appears that campaign
expenditures do not attain that goal.
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Table 3.7. Multiple regression on same-sex marriage ban campaign expenditures per
capita
Proponent Spending

Opponent Spending

Total Spending

Variable

Coefficient
(Standard Error)

Coefficient
(Standard Error)

Coefficient
(Standard Error)

Education Levels

-.029
(.028)

-.019
(.045)

-.048
(.069)

Percent Democrats

.005
(.016)

-.010
(.026)

-.005
(.040)

Percent Evangelical .002
(.015)

.021
(.025)

.022
(.038)

Religiosity

-.040*
(.017)

-.069*
(.027)

-.109*
(.040)

Year of Election

.143**
(.048)

.178*
(.078)

.322*
(.118)

Constant

-283.78**
(97.59)

-352.32*
(156.99)

-636*
(238)

N=28
R2= .57

N=28
R2= .52

N=28
R2= .57

*p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001

In order to help explain what prompts organizations to spend more money in
one state rather than another, a regression was run using per capita campaign
expenditures as the dependent variable. As can be seen in Table 3.7, the only variables
that have a statistically significant impact on the amount of money spent on a same-sex
marriage ban campaign in a state are how religious the state is and the year of the
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election. For every one point increase in the percentage responding that religion is
important, total campaign expenditures decrease by $0.11 per capita. Gay marriage
bans pass more easily in states that are more religious. This result suggests that perhaps
less money is spent in these states because it is assumed that the ban will pass
regardless of how much money is spent. Additionally, more money is being spent on
same-sex marriage ban campaigns each year. For every year that passes, $0.32 more per
capita is being spent on these campaigns. This is likely due to the increased salience of
the issue nationally.

Gambling
In order to test whether campaign expenditures have an impact on outcomes of
other ballot measures, it would helpful at this point to examine a different direct
democracy issue. There are similarities and differences between the issues of marriage
equality and gambling. Like same-sex marriage, gambling is an issue that has been a
subject in direct democracy campaigns in many states. However, gambling is different
than gay marriage bans since it is rarely considered a morality issue.
While there are some moral objections to gambling, lottery critics mostly avoid
morality arguments and instead denounce the negative consequences of gambling and
criticize the role of government in sanctioning lotteries. Lottery supporters focus on the
benefits of lottery creation, such as jobs and revenues for state programs (Ferraiolo
2013). When opponents did use morality frames to argue against lotteries, they often
argued against the morality of the government taking this action rather than arguing
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against the morality of private, individual behavior (Ferraiolo 2013). Reviewing
legislative debates of the adoption of a state lottery, Ferraiolo (2013) found that
opponents were mostly concerned about the regressive nature of lotteries, lotteries’
poor odds of winning, and their fiscal inefficiency. Opposition is often not framed
around the immorality of personal gambling behavior and rarely references God or the
Bible. According to Ferraiolo (2013, 223), “Observers have argued that playing the
lottery is seen in many quarters as no more morally questionable or harmful that many
other forms of entertainment.” According to a 2013 Pew survey, 25 percent of
Americans believe that gambling is morally acceptable, while 47 percent do not consider
it to be a moral issue at all and another 24 percent believe it is morally unacceptable
(Pew 2014).
The gambling initiatives that were included in this analysis were all between
2004 and 2010. Six of these measures would have authorized new gambling facilities in
the state. Two measures sought to legalize new machines at facilities that already
existed and the remaining three would have allowed slot machines at racing tracks. It
appears that only one of these pitted casino interests against each other. Ohio
Amendment 6 in 2008 would have authorized a single casino near Wilmington
(Ballotpedia). This measure more than doubled the previous record for most-expensive
campaign in Ohio history. The opposition was mostly financed by Penn National Gaming,
Inc., a Pennsylvania based casino company. Penn National Gaming operates a casino in
Indiana, less than 30 miles from Cincinnati (Ballotpedia).
The same control variables were used as in the gay marriage analysis to increase
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comparability. These control variables are education levels, the percent of Democrats,
the percent of Evangelicals, and the religiosity of each state. Since campaign
expenditures usually have a significant effect on ballot initiative outcomes, I expect
there to be a significant relationship between campaign expenditures and the outcome
of gambling ballot initiatives.

Table 3.8. Multiple regression on gambling ballot initiative votes
Independent Variables

OLS Coefficient
(Bootstrap Standard Error)

Ratio of Money Spent by Supporters to
Money Spent by Opposition

.081
(1.481)

Education Levels

1.704
(1.994)

Percent Democrats

1.663***
(.495)

Percent Evangelical

.059
(.596)

Religiosity

-1.173
(.621)

Constant

20.043
(51.217)

N
R2

10
.91

*p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001

The results detailed in Table 3.8 indicate that campaign expenditures are not
significantly correlated with the outcomes of gambling ballot initiatives, although the
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regression coefficient is positive as expected. Partisanship was actually the only variable
that was significantly correlated with gambling ballot measure outcomes. Pro-gambling
initiatives tend to receive more voter support in states with more Democrats. There is a
smaller sample of state gambling measures for this time period, but the results again
suggest that campaign spending is not closely related to the election results.

Discussion
Campaign expenditures are an important factor to determine the outcome of
most types of ballot initiatives. Theories of direct democracy argue that campaign
expenditures are one of the most important factors in the passage or failure of ballot
initiatives. However, not all ballot initiatives are the same. When dealing with ballot
initiatives on a morality issue such as same-sex marriage, I found that campaign
expenditures do not have a significant effect on election outcomes. Demographic and
political variables, such as partisanship, education, and religion are far more important
to outcomes of gay marriage ban campaigns than campaign expenditures are. This
suggests that voters in same-sex marriage ban campaigns do not need to reply upon
heuristics in the same way that voters in most direct democracy campaigns do. While
most ballot measures deal with relatively complex issues that have high information
costs, same-sex marriage has much lower information needs. Many voters already have
an opinion regarding marriage equality and therefore do not need heuristics, such as
campaign advertising, to make gathering information and deciding how to vote easier.
Rather than campaign expenditures, demographic variables and political attitudes
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remain key in determining outcomes of same-sex marriage ban campaigns, as has been
found in numerous previous studies.
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Chapter 4: Experiments Testing Elite Endorsements

The data in the previous chapter showed that campaign expenditures do not
have a significant impact on outcomes of same sex marriage ballot measures. This
chapter will show that the same is true for endorsements from political elites. The
common wisdom is that endorsements from elites generally influence public opinion.
Information from political elites can impact public opinion at any time, not only during
an election.
In most ballot initiative campaigns, endorsements from political elites have a
significant effect on outcomes. Ballot measure campaigns seek out endorsements from
political elites for exactly this reason. Endorsements from political elites can send a
partisan cue to voters, giving them cues to help them decide how to vote on an issue. If
a voter generally agrees with or likes a particular political elite, the knowledge that the
politician supports or opposes a specific ballot measure can impact one’s own opinion
on that measure. Endorsements from an elite that a voter does not like can also
influence one’s opinion on an issue in the opposite direction.
While endorsements from political elites usually influence voters in direct
democracy elections, I argue that this will not be the case for same-sex marriage ban
campaigns. As already demonstrated, same-sex marriage is a different type of issue than
those often addressed by direct democracy. Morality issues such as same-sex marriage
have low information needs. In same-sex marriage ban campaigns, voters will not need
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to rely on the information that can be provided by elite endorsements to help them
form their opinion on the issue. Therefore, I argue that elite endorsements will not be as
important for these types of ballot initiatives.
In this chapter I will use ordinal logit regression and two different survey
experiments to examine the effects of elite endorsements on opinion on marriage
equality.

Methods and Data
It is impossible to find comparable data on elite endorsements for each same-sex
marriage ban election. Some of the campaigns, especially the earlier ones, received little
to no media attention. In these less salient elections, it is unclear whether any political
elites endorsed either side and that information is difficult to find even when there were
elite endorsements. Even when the issue is more salient, there are many politicians that
have preferred to stay away from the issue so as not to alienate any voters. There is also
inconsistency in the reporting of these endorsements. Certain politicians’ support or
opposition may be reported on more than others. Therefore a senator’s endorsement in
one state might not be comparable to a senator’s endorsement in another state if it was
not reported as widely or frequently.
Due to the difficulty of finding actual data on elite endorsements of same-sex
marriage bans, I conducted a survey experiment using Mechanical Turk to test the
endorsement hypothesis. Numerous studies have shown that Mechanical Turk is a
useful, and cost-effective source for experimental samples (Paolacci et al 2010; Berinsky
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et al 2012). Goodman et al (2013) conclude that Mechanical Turk samples produce
reliable results that are consistent with standard decision-making biases. They found
many similarities between Mechanical Turk samples and traditional samples. Paolacci et
al (2010) found that participants in Mechanical Turk surveys exhibit the same classic
heuristics and biases as those from traditional sources. Mechanical Turk samples are
significantly more diverse than typical American college samples. Data obtained through
Mechanical Turk are at least as reliable as those obtained via traditional methods
(Buhrmester et al 2011). Finally, Mechanical Turk respondents are usually more
representative and more diverse than convenience samples (Berinsky et al 2012)
The survey was conducted from July 3 - July 24, 2013 and received 998
responses. There were two different forms of the survey to which respondents were
randomly assigned. In one form of the survey, respondents were asked their opinions on
same-sex marriage and gambling, as well as several demographic questions. In the other
form of the survey, they were asked the same questions, but were primed with an elite
endorsement for the issue. For example, the primed version of the same-sex marriage
questions is:
“Barack Obama has recently stated his support for samesex marriage. Do you favor or oppose allow gays and
lesbians to marry legally?”
The full survey can be found in the appendix.
As with most Mechanical Turk surveys, the respondents were not fully
representative of the United States population as a whole. There were more male
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respondents (64 percent) than female respondents (35 percent) and a few transgender
respondents (3 total). The sample was also not racially diverse, as is detailed in Table
4.1. The sample was also quite liberal: 53 percent identified as liberal, 33 percent as
moderate, and only 13 percent as conservative. There were also many non-religious
respondents. Fifty-six percent of the respondents chose “none” when asked about their
religion and 50 percent never attend religious services.

Table 4.1. Race of survey respondents
Race of Respondent

Number

Percent

White

701

70.31%

Black

36

3.61%

Hispanic/Latino

59

5.92%

Asian

147

14.74%

Other/Multiracial

54

5.42%

Source: Mechanical Turk survey, 7/3-7/24/2013

The dependent variable for this analysis is the response to the question: “Do you
favor or oppose allowing gays and lesbians to marry legally?” Respondents were given
four options: strongly favor, somewhat favor, somewhat oppose, and strongly oppose.
The responses are detailed below in Table 4.2. A large majority of the Mechanical Turk
respondents favor marriage equality. According to Gallup, at the time of this survey, 53
percent of Americans favored legalizing same-sex marriage (Gallup 2013).
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The main independent variable is a dummy variable indicating whether the
respondent was informed about President Obama’s endorsement of marriage equality.
The respondent's opinion of President Obama is likely to impact how much his
endorsement of same-sex marriage would impact their own opinion on the subject.
Those who either strongly approve or strongly disapprove of President Obama’s job
should be more likely to be influenced by his opinion on the issue. To capture this
relationship, an interaction term with the respondents’ approval of President Obama
and whether the respondent received the priming treatment was included as an
independent variable.

Table 4.2. “Do you favor allowing gays and lesbians to marry legally?”
Number

Percent

Strongly favor

653

65.69%

Somewhat favor

192

19.32%

Somewhat oppose

74

7.44%

Strongly oppose

75

7.55%

Source: Mechanical Turk survey, 7/3-7/24/2013

Control variables were also included in the analysis. Sex was included as a
control variable since women are more likely to support gay rights policies (Brumbaugh
et al 2008; Herek 2002). Race was also included as a dummy variable for white or
nonwhite. As noted in Chapter 2, African-Americans are less likely than other races to
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approve of homosexuality; however, this disapproval does not always translate into
opposition to gay rights policies (Lewis 2003). A significant relationship between race
and support for marriage equality is therefore not expected.
Party identification and ideology were included in the analysis. Respondents
were asked their party identification and given the options of Democrat, Independent,
or Republican. For ideology, they were asked to choose between liberal, moderate, and
conservative. Democrats and liberals have been found in several studies to be more
supportive of gay rights, including same-sex marriage (Haider-Markel & Meier 2003;
Brumbaugh et al 2008; Schwartz 2010). A positive correlation with support for same-sex
marriage is expected.
Contact with gays and lesbians was included as a control variable. Respondents
were asked if any of their immediate family members, relatives, neighbors, co-workers,
or close friends were gay, lesbian, or bisexual. Contact with gays or lesbians has been
shown to have a positive correlation with opinion on homosexuality and gay rights.
(Brewer 2008; Brown and Henriquez 2011; Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2008; Hans et al
2012)
Religion was also included as a control variable. Respondents were asked with
which religion they identify. They were given the following options: “Protestant,”
“Catholic,” “Mormon/LDS,” “Other Christian,” “Jewish,” “Muslim,” “Something else,”
and “None.” Respondents were categorized as Christian if their response was
Protestant, Catholic Mormon/LDS, or other Christian. Respondents were also asked if
they identified as a born-again or evangelical Christian. This was included as a dummy
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variable. Those who identify as evangelical are expected to be less supportive of
marriage equality.

Results
Simply looking at a cross-tabulation of the dependent variable and the main
independent variable shows that there is not much difference in support for same-sex
marriage between those who were primed with the elite endorsements and those who
were not.

Table 4.3. Cross-tabulation of support for same-sex marriage and elite priming
“Do you favor allowing

Not Primed

Primed

Strongly favor

333

67%

320

64%

Somewhat favor

105

21%

87

17%

Somewhat oppose

30

6%

44

9%

Strongly oppose

28

6%

47

9%

gays to marry legally?”

Pearson’s Chi-Squared = 9.40

Source: Mechanical Turk survey, 7/3-7/24/2013

An ordinal logit regression was also run and results are detailed in Table 4.46. In
Model 1, without the interaction term, the priming treatment is statistically significant.
6

A model was also run without the control variables. The results indicated no significant correlation
between the respondent’s support for same-sex marriage and whether the respondent received the
priming treatment. The results are detailed in the Appendix Table A.4.

71

However, this effect is in the opposite direction than would be expected. Respondents
who received the priming treatment were more likely to express opposition for samesex marriage. However, when the interaction term is included in Model 2, the
relationship is no longer statistically significant. The interaction term helps to make
sense of why the priming treatment works in the direction opposite than one would
expect. The effect of the prime is only statistically significant for people who disapprove
of Pres. Obama, as can be seen in Table 4.5. The effect of the priming treatment is not
reliable since its statistical significance depends on which covariates are included. There
is evidence that the priming treatment does affect opinion on marriage equality, but not
for everyone.
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Table 4.4. Ordinal logit regression on opinion on same-sex marriage
Model 1
(without interaction term)

Model 2
(with interaction term)

Coefficient
(Standard
Error)

Percent
Change

Coefficient
(Standard
Error)
.235
(.173)

Respondent Received the
Elite Prime

.465**
(.152)

59.2%

-.192
(.504)

Approval of Obama’s Job

.101
(.102)

-.031
(.140)

Sex of Respondent

-.084
(.167)

-.088
(.167)

Race of Respondent

-.136
(.167)

-.134
(.167)

Party Identification

.163
(.147)

.164
(.147)

Contact with a Gay Man
or Lesbian

.929***
(.153)

153.3%

.927***
(.154)

152.8%

Ideology

1.406***
(.145)

308.0%

1.411***
(.145)

309.8%

Christian

.907***
(.171)

147.8%

.915***
(.171)

149.8%

Evangelical

-1.080***
(.236)

-66.0%

-1.057***
(.237)

-65.3%

Independent Variables

Interaction Between
Receiving the Elite Prime
and Approval of Obama’s
Job

N=964
Pseudo R2=
.23
*p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001

Percent
Change

N=964
Pseudo R2=
.23

Source: Mechanical Turk survey, 7/3-7/24/20137

7

The brant test for this regression was significant, indicating that the parallel regression assumption was
violated by the ideology and Christian variables.
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Table 4.5. Impact of the priming treatment on marriage equality for different levels of
Obama approval
Approval of Pres. Obama

Coefficient
(Standard Error)

Strong approve

.043
(.344)

Somewhat approve

.278
(.204)

Somewhat disapprove

.513***
(.156)

Strongly disapprove

.748**
(.258)

*p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001

Source: Mechanical Turk survey, 7/3-7/24/2013

Some of the demographic variables performed well. As expected, religious
variables were significant in a negative direction with support for same-sex marriage.
Evangelical respondents were more likely to be opposed to gay marriage than nonEvangelical respondents. Ideology was positively correlated with support for marriage
equality, but party identification was not. Contact with a gay man or lesbian was also
positively correlated with support for marriage equality. Having a relative, co-worker, or
close friend who is gay increases the likelihood that the respondent approves of samesex marriage by 154 percent. Sex and race were not found to be significant.
In addition to the Mechanical Turk Survey, I was also able to use data from an
exit poll conducted during the St. Louis City mayoral primary election on March 5, 2013.
As in the Mechanical Turk survey, there were two conditions to which respondents were
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randomly assigned. Approximately half of the respondents were told of President
Obama’s views on same-sex marriage and then asked their opinion, while the remaining
respondents were simply asked their opinion on same-sex marriage. The two versions of
the question are:
"Do you favor or oppose President Obama's proposal to
legalize same-sex marriage?"
or
"Do you favor or oppose a proposal to legalize same-sex
marriage?"
The respondents of the exit poll strongly identify with the Democratic Party (69
percent), as is to be expected from the City of St. Louis. The sample is also more
religious than the Mechanical Turk sample. Sixty-seven percent of respondents report
being a Christian (either Catholic, Protestant, or “Other Christian”) and only 17 percent
claim no religion. Only 23 percent of respondents report never going to religious service,
while 39 percent report going once a week. The exit poll sample is also more racially
diverse than the Mechanical Turk survey. A slim majority (55 percent) identified as
White, 42 percent as Black, and small minorities identifying as either Asian,
Hispanic/Latino, or other (.6%, .6%, and 1.3% respectively). Their opinions on same-sex
marriage are also more varied than the Mechanical Turk survey, as detailed below in
Table 4.5. As opposed to the Mechanical Turk survey, the St. Louis exit poll sample
consists entirely of actual voters.
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Table 4.6. “Do you favor allowing gays to marry legally?”
Number

Percent

Strongly favor

246

46.86%

Somewhat favor

113

21.52%

Somewhat oppose

46

8.76%

Strongly oppose

120

22.86%

Source: St. Louis exit poll, 3/5/2013

The results of the ordinal logit regression using the exit poll data are detailed in
Table 4.7.8 Respondents in this survey were not asked about their approval of Pres.
Obama. In Model 2, the priming treatment is instead interacted with the race of the
respondent. Whether the respondent received the priming was not significantly
correlated with opinion on same-sex marriage in both models. The priming treatment is
broken down by race in Table 4.8. The priming treatment is not statistically significant
for either Whites or non-Whites. With both surveys showing similar results, there is
strong evidence that elite endorsements do not affect opinion on marriage equality.

8

A model was also run without the control variables. The results indicated no significant correlation
between the respondent’s support for same-sex marriage and whether the respondent received the
priming treatment. The results are detailed in the Appendix Table A.5.
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Table 4.7. Ordinal logit regression on opinion on same-sex marriage

Independent Variables

Model 1
(without interaction term)

Model 2
(with interaction term)

Coefficient
(Standard
Error)

Coefficient
(Standard
Error)

Percent
Change

Interaction Between
Receiving the Elite Prime
and Race of Respondent

Percent
Change

-.350
(.403)

Respondent Received the
Elite Prime

.153
(.199)

.355
(.306)

Sex of Respondent

-.240
(.200)

-.241
(.200)

Race of Respondent
(Non-White)

-.955***
(.215)

-61.5%

-.424
(.647)

Party Identification

.282*
(.115)

32.6%

.275*
(.116)

31.7%

Ideology

1.260***
(.159)

252.7%

1.269***
(.159)

255.6%

Education Level

-.409***
(.097)

-33.7%

-.408***
(.098)

-33.5%

Christian

.646*
(.252)

90.7%

.632*
(.253)

88.1%

Religiosity

-.450***
(.096)

-36.2%

-.452***
(.096)

-36.4%

N=445
Pseudo R2= .20
*p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001

N=445
Pseudo R2= .20

Source: St. Louis 2013 exit poll9

9

The brant test for these regression models was not significant, indicating that the parallel regression
assumption was not violated.
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Some of the demographic variables performed differently from the Mechanical
Turk survey. While race and party identification were insignificant in the Mechanical
Turk survey, in the St. Louis exit poll they were both significant and positively correlated
with opinion on marriage equality. Both religion and religiosity were significant and
negatively correlated with marriage equality opinion as expected. As in the Mechanical
Turk survey, ideology was also significant and positively correlated with marriage
equality opinion.

Table 4.8. Impact of the priming treatment for different races
Race

Coefficient
(Standard Error)

White

.005
(.262)

Non-White

-.345
(.607)

*p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001

Source: St. Louis 2013 exit poll

The results from both surveys show that being primed with President Obama’s
support for same-sex marriage did not influence most respondents’ opinion on the
issue. Both surveys were conducted quite differently. The Mechanical Turk survey was
an online survey conducted over the span of a few weeks. The respondents for the
Mechanical Turk survey were more liberal and less religious than the average American.
The St. Louis exit poll was conducted in person on one day in one city. The exit poll
sample was more diverse and more religious than the Mechanical Turk survey. Even
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though both surveys were conducted quite differently, the results were quite similar.
Both surveys indicated that the priming treatment had no effect on most individuals’
opinions on marriage equality.
This suggests that elite endorsements do not have an effect on same-sex
marriage opinion. Elite endorsements often help voters shape their opinions on
numerous issues. Elite endorsements can function as a proxy for a party label in direct
democracy elections. Elite endorsements can help subsidize information costs. It again
appears that marriage equality is a different type of issue. As a morality issue, marriage
equality has lower information needs than most of the issues that confront voters.
Therefore voters will not need to be as reliant on cues from political elites to form their
opinion.

Gambling
As in Chapter 3, we will look at the issue of gambling as a comparison. Gambling
is less of a morality issue than marriage equality. Like same-sex marriage, gambling is an
issue that has been voted on by ballot initiative in many states. In the Mechanical Turk
survey, respondents were asked if they favor increasing access to gambling. Half of the
respondents were informed that Mitt Romney opposes increasing access to gambling.
During the 2012 presidential campaign Romney mentioned his opposition to internet
gambling, citing “the social costs associated with gaming” (Corn 2012). In one form of
the survey, respondents were asked their opinions on gambling, as well as several
demographic questions. In the other form of the survey, they were asked the same
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questions, but were primed with an elite endorsement for the issue.
“Mitt Romney has stated his opposition to increasing
access to gambling. Do you favor or oppose increasing
access to gambling?”

Table 4.9. “Do you favor increasing access to gambling?”
Number

Percent

Strongly favor

144

14.44%

Somewhat favor

424

42.53%

Somewhat oppose

352

35.31%

Strongly oppose

77

7.72%

Source: Mechanical Turk survey, 7/3-7/24/2013

We can see in Table 4.9 that the respondents were much more ambivalent about
the issue of gambling than they were about same-sex marriage. For the issue of samesex marriage, 73 percent of the respondents gave strongly favored or strongly opposed
responses (see Table 4.2). For the issue of gambling, most respondents clustered in the
middle, giving “somewhat” responses, indicating that they did not feel strongly about
the issue.
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Table 4.10. Cross-tabulation of support for gambling and elite prime
“Do you favor increasing

Not Primed

Primed

Strongly favor

76

15%

68

14%

Somewhat favor

231

46%

193

39%

Somewhat oppose

173

35%

179

36%

Strongly oppose

20

4%

57

11%

access to gambling?”

Pearson’s Chi-Squared = 21.72 Source: Mechanical Turk survey, 7/3-7/24/2013

The crosstabulation in Table 4.10 seems to indicate that priming might have a
slight impact on opinion on gambling. More respondents in the primed group strongly
oppose gambling than in the group that was not primed with Romney’s position on
gambling. There are also fewer respondents in the primed group that somewhat favor
gambling than in the group that was not primed. This seems to show that being primed
with Romney’s position on gambling decreases support for increasing access to
gambling.
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Table 4.11. Ordinal logit regression on opinion on gambling
Model 1
(without interaction term)

Model 2
(with interaction term)

Coefficient
(Standard
Error)

Percent
Change

Coefficient
(Standard
Error)
.102
(.143)

Respondent Received the
Elite Prime

.375**
(.121)

45.6%

.108
(.392)

Approval of Obama’s Job

-.214*
(.083)

-19.3%

-.265*
(.109)

-23.3%

Sex of Respondent

-.431***
(.125)

-35.0%

-.429***
(.125)

-34.9%

Race of Respondent

-.396**
(.135)

-32.7%

-.396**
(.135)

-32.7%

Party Identification

.016
(.126)

.017
(.126)

Ideology

.026
(.122)

.027
(.122)

Christian

-.063
(.149)

-.060
(.149)

Evangelical

-.770***
(.228)

Independent Variables

Interaction Between
Receiving the Elite Prime
and Approval of Obama’s
Job

N = 975
Pseudo R2 = .02

-53.7%

-.760**
(.229)

Percent
Change

-53.2%

N = 975
Pseudo R2 = .02

*p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001

82

An ordinal logit regression model was estimated and the results are detailed
below in Table 4.1110. Prior to including the interaction term, there was a significant
correlation between the respondent’s support for increasing access to gambling and
whether the respondent received the priming treatment noting Governor Romney’s
opposition to the issue. However, once the dependent variable was changed to an
interaction between receiving the prime and the respondent’s approval of President
Obama’s job, the relationship was no longer statistically significant.
Unlike the issue of marriage equality, the prime seems to work on most
respondents, except those who highly approved of Pres. Obama’s job. This is detailed in
Table 4.12. Unfortunately, the respondents were not asked about their approval of
Governor Romney. Using their approval of President Obama so soon after the 2012
presidential election is a relatively close approximation of the respondents’ approval of
Governor Romney, but it possible that the results would have been different if the
respondents were asked their approval of Governor Romney. However, it appears that
being primed with Governor Romney’s opinion on the issue did not influence the
respondents’ opinion on the issue. Race and sex were significantly correlated with
opinion on gambling, as was identifying as Evangelical.

10

A model was also run without the control variables. In this model, there is a statistically significant
correlation between the respondent’s support for increasing access to gambling and whether the
respondent received the priming treatment. The results are detailed in Appendix Table A.6.
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Table 4.12. Impact of the priming treatment on gambling for different levels of Obama
approval
Approval of Pres. Obama

Coefficient
(Standard Error)

Strong approve

.210
(.260)

Somewhat approve

.312*
(.149)

Somewhat disapprove

.415**
(.133)

Strongly disapprove

.517*
(.231)

*p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001

Source: Mechanical Turk survey, 7/3-7/24/2013

Discussion
The results in this chapter indicate that elite endorsements do not influence all
voters’ opinions on same-sex marriage. Results from both the Mechanical Turk survey
and the St. Louis Exit Poll show that being primed with President Obama’s opinion on
same-sex marriage did not influence the all respondents’ opinion on the issue. This
suggests that H2 is correct and that elite endorsements do not have an effect on samesex marriage opinion. While asking for respondents’ opinions on marriage equality is not
exactly the same as them voting on a ballot measure, the policy decision is the same in
both instances. Thus, public opinion is closely tied to vote choice. If an elite
endorsement does not influence opinion on marriage equality in a survey, it is likely that
it would also not influence vote choice on a ballot measure.

84

For most issues, elite endorsements can help voters shape their opinion by
subsidizing information costs. However, as a morality issue, marriage equality has lower
information needs than many other issues. Therefore voters do not need to rely on
heuristics such as elite endorsements in order to form their opinion.
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Chapter 5: Conclusion

In this study I attempted to determine whether the assumptions made for direct
democracy campaigns also applied to campaigns to ban same-sex marriage. It is usually
argued that voters will rely more on heuristics when voting on ballot measures than
when voting on candidates since ballot measures are usually low-information, lowsalience contests. Heuristics can be quite helpful to voters by subsidizing their
information costs. Rather than gathering complete information on candidates or ballot
measures, voters can rely on heuristics to guide their decisions. The two main heuristics
that I focus on in this study are campaign expenditures (as a proxy for campaign
advertising and messaging) and elite endorsements. While in candidate elections, there
are more heuristics available to voters (such as party label and past performance), these
two are the most widely available in direct democracy campaigns.
These heuristics are generally useful to direct democracy voters. However, I
found that this is not the case with the issue of marriage equality. As a morality issue,
marriage equality has low information needs. Morality issues are about basic values and
voters often rely on their “gut” to make moral decisions, rather than relying on
information given to them by a campaign. Marriage equality is also a highly salient issue,
which lowers information costs further. Since issues such as marriage equality have low
information needs, voters do not need to be as dependent on heuristics to aid them in
making their voter choice.
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In Chapter 3, I examined the impact of campaign expenditures on same-sex
marriage ban outcomes. Previous research indicates that campaign expenditures usually
have an impact on ballot initiative outcomes. I found support for my hypothesis that
campaign expenditures do not have an effect on the outcome of same-sex marriage
bans. Instead, many demographic and political variables, such as partisanship,
education, and religion, were significantly correlated with same-sex marriage ban
outcomes, confirming the results of numerous previous studies. This has the potential to
impact how ballot measure campaigns are conducted. Each year, increasing amounts
money are spent on ballot measures. Nearly $1 trillion was donated to ballot measure
campaigns in 2012 (National Institute on Money in State Politics). The assumption for
those who donate to these campaigns is that these donations will impact the outcome
of the ballot measure. Yet for certain issues, these expenditures may not have an effect
on the outcome of the election.
In Chapter 4, I examined the influence of elite endorsements on marriage
equality opinion. Endorsements from elites usually have an effect on issue opinion. I
found some support for my hypothesis that elite endorsements do not influence opinion
on marriage equality. Using data from two survey experiments, I found that whether a
respondent received a prime informing her of President Obama’s support for gay
marriage was not significantly correlated with opinion on gay marriage. Many
organizations pursue endorsements from political elites in the hopes that this
information will sway voter opinion. These endorsements likely do influence opinion on
many issues, but it appears that it does not have the intended effect on same-sex
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marriage. This is significant because President Obama has polarized public opinion on
other issues, like health care and criminal justice reform, by taking public positions on
those issues.
Taken together, these results suggest that voters in same-sex marriage
campaigns do not rely upon heuristics in the same way that voters in most direct
democracy campaigns do. While most ballot measures deal with relatively complex
issues that have high information costs, social issues such as same-sex marriage have
much lower information needs. Many voters already have an opinion regarding
marriage equality and therefore do not need heuristics, such as campaign advertising or
elite endorsements, to make gathering information and deciding how to vote easier.
Rather than campaign expenditures, demographic variables and political attitudes
remain key in determining outcomes of same-sex marriage ban campaigns, as has been
found in numerous previous studies.
These results also indicate that voting behavior on ballot measures is not
monolithic. The same factors do not predict outcomes for all ballot measures. While
campaign spending and elite endorsements are significant predictors for many ballot
measures, they cannot predict outcomes for all ballot measures. As the results for the
gambling ballot measures show, sometimes even the usual demographic and political
attitude variables cannot predict outcomes.
In a variation on the likability heuristic, voting decisions on gay marriage ban
ballot measures are likely influenced by what people think about homosexuality and gay
people. In the state-level analysis on the effect of campaign expenditures, one of the
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significant predictors of the outcome was the year of the election. There has been
significant long-term movement in public opinion towards gay rights and the gay
community in the past decade and this is likely why the year of the election had such an
impact. In the individual-level analysis on the effect of elite endorsements, one of the
significant predictors of opinion was contact with a gay man or lesbian. This likability
effect may also be a factor in other ballot measures that target specific groups, such as
immigration.
Future research will examine the usefulness of heuristics for other types social
issue ballot measures such as abortion and marijuana. Since the number of ballot
measures continues to increase, this will continue to be an important question. While
the fight for marriage equality moved from the ballot box to the courthouse, there are
other social issues that are increasingly being determined by direct democracy.
Marijuana policies have been voted on nineteen times from 2008-2014 and these issues
may appear on the ballot in eighteen more states in 2016. Ballot measures that regulate
abortion have been voted on seven times in the same years. Do voters on these issues
rely on heuristics such as campaign expenditures and elite endorsements? Public
opinion on abortion is relatively stable, therefore individuals would be unlikely to be
swayed by campaign expenditures or elite endorsements. Public opinion on marijuana is
similar to opinion on marriage equality in that it has been increasing steadily over the
past few decades. And there have been very few elites that have taken a public position
on legalizing marijuana.

90

91

Appendix
Mechanical Turk Survey - Form A

conducted July 3-24, 2013; 998 respondents

1. Do you usually think of yourself as:
a. Democratic
b. Republican
c. Independent
2. Barack Obama has recently stated his support for same-sex marriage. Do you
favor or oppose allow gays and lesbians to marry legally?
a. Strongly favor
b. Somewhat favor
c. Somewhat oppose
d. Strongly oppose
3. Do you approve or disapprove of the way Barack Obama is handling his job as
president?
a. Strongly approve
b. Somewhat approve
c. Somewhat disapprove
d. Strongly disapprove
4. Among your immediate family members, relatives, neighbors, co-workers, or
close friends, are any of them gay, lesbian, or bisexual as far as you know?
a. Yes
b. No
5. Mitt Romney has stated his opposition to increasing access to gambling. Do you
favor or oppose increasing access to gambling?
a. Strongly favor
b. Somewhat favor
c. Somewhat oppose
d. Strongly oppose
6. On most political matters, do you consider yourself:
a. Liberal
b. Moderate
c. Conservative
7. Are you:
a. Protestant
b. Catholic
c. Mormon/LDS
d. Other Christian
e. Jewish
f. Muslim
g. Something else
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h. None
8. Would you describe yourself as a born-again or evangelical Christian?
a. Yes
b. No
9. How often do you attend religious services?
a. More than once a week
b. Once a week
c. A few times a month
d. A few times a year
e. Never
10. Are you:
a. Female
b. Male
11. Are you:
a. White
b. Black
c. Hispanic/Latino
d. Asian
e. Other
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Mechanical Turk Survey - Form B

conducted July 3-24, 2013; 998 respondents

1. Do you usually think of yourself as:
a. Democratic
b. Republican
c. Independent
2. Do you favor or oppose allow gays and lesbians to marry legally?
a. Strongly favor
b. Somewhat favor
c. Somewhat oppose
d. Strongly oppose
3. Do you approve or disapprove of the way Barack Obama is handling his job as
president?
a. Strongly approve
b. Somewhat approve
c. Somewhat disapprove
d. Strongly disapprove
4. Among your immediate family members, relatives, neighbors, co-workers, or
close friends, are any of them gay, lesbian, or bisexual as far as you know?
a. Yes
b. No
5. Do you favor or oppose increasing access to gambling?
a. Strongly favor
b. Somewhat favor
c. Somewhat oppose
d. Strongly oppose
6. On most political matters, do you consider yourself:
a. Liberal
b. Moderate
c. Conservative
7. Are you:
a. Protestant
b. Catholic
c. Mormon/LDS
d. Other Christian
e. Jewish
f. Muslim
g. Something else
h. None
8. Would you describe yourself as a born-again or evangelical Christian?
a. Yes
b. No
9. How often do you attend religious services?
a. More than once a week
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b. Once a week
c. A few times a month
d. A few times a year
e. Never
10. Are you:
a. Female
b. Male
11. Are you:
a. White
b. Black
c. Hispanic/Latino
d. Asian
e. Other

95

Table A.1. Campaign Spending on Same-Sex Marriage Ballot Initiatives
State

Year

Spent by
Supporters

Spent by
Opposition

Ratio

North Dakota
Missouri
Wisconsin
Washington
Montana
Colorado

2004
2004
2006
2012
2004
2006

$0
$29,612
$647,491
$2,724,100
$10,870
$1,369,754

$8,974
$488,189
$4,313,365
$15,063,677
$51,498
$5,459,145

0
.061
.150
.181
.211
.251

Idaho
Virginia

2006
2006

$27,104
$413,490

$106,378
$1,545,257

.255
.268

Maryland
Maine
South Carolina
Florida
Kentucky
Arizona
Maine

2012
2012
2006
2008
2004
2006
2009

$1,734,482
$2,572,534
$108,545
$1,607,574
$201,132
$1,039,093
$3,367,018

$6,371,357
$8,891,988
$370,427
$4,327,703
$522,864
$1,899,948
$5,678,579

.272
.289
.293
.371
.385
.547
.593

Texas
Utah
South Dakota
Oregon
California
Minnesota
Ohio
Kansas
North Carolina
Louisiana

2005
2004
2006
2004
2008
2012
2004
2005
2012
2004

$505,992
$506,922
$123,166
$2,434,454
$40,455,774
$4,099,445
$1,202,761
$158,729
$4,595,543
$43,117

$782,409
$780,740
$171,578
$2,933,998
$45,624,979
$3,267,703
$942,421
$106,011
$2,863,201
$23,547

.647
.649
.718
.830
.887
1.255
1.276
1.497
1.605
1.831

Oklahoma
Tennessee
Michigan
Arizona
Arkansas
Georgia
Mississippi

2004
2006
2004
2008
2004
2004
2004

$21,644
$299,279
$1,930,429
$7,764,115
$334,731
$92,765
$7,215

$11,616
$158,814
$854,212
$823,041
$2,952
$0
$0

1.863
1.884
2.260
9.433
113.391
92765*
7215*
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Table A.2. Multiple regression on voter support for same-sex marriage bans,
2000-2012
Proponent Spending

Opponent Spending

OLS Coefficient
(Bootstrap Standard
Error)
-.552
(.546)

OLS Coefficient
(Bootstrap Standard
Error)
-.224
(.370)

Education Levels

-.134
(.356)

-.179
(.277)

Percent Democrats

-.231
(.203)

-.301*
(.137)

Percent Evangelical

.535
(.322)

.442*
(.214)

Religiosity

.298
(.294)

.407*
(.206)

Year of Election

-1.231***
(.340)

-1.362***
(.226)***

Constant

2521***
(675)

2778
(447)

N
R2

30
.87

Independent Variables

Log of campaign expenditures

*p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001
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Table A.3. Multiple regression on voter support for same-sex marriage bans, 20002012, excluding Utah and Arkansas
Independent Variables

OLS Coefficient
(Bootstrap Standard Error)

Ratio of Money Spent by Supporters to
Money Spent by Opposition

.0000009
(.336)

Education Levels

-.281
(.363)

Percent Democrats

-.314*
(.148)

Percent Evangelical

.511
(.283)

Religiosity

.399
(.251)

Year of Election

-1.423***
(.243)

Constant

2900***
(486.25)

N
R2

30
.85

*p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001
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Table A.4. Ordinal logit regression on opinion on same-sex marriage
Independent Variables

Coefficient
(Standard Error)

Respondent Received the Elite Prime

.203
(.131)

N=994
Pseudo R2= .001
*p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001

Source: Mechanical Turk survey, 7/3-7/24/2013

Table A.5. Ordinal logit regression on opinion on same-sex marriage
Independent Variables

Coefficient
(Standard Error)

Respondent Received the Elite Prime

.173
(.162)

N=994
Pseudo R2= .001
*p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001

Source: St. Louis 2013 exit poll

Table A.6. Ordinal logit regression on opinion on gambling
Independent Variables

Coefficient
(Standard Error)

Percent
Change

Respondent Received the Elite Prime

.379***
(.118)

46.1%

N=997
Pseudo R2= .004
*p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001

Source: Mechanical Turk survey, 7/3-7/24/2013
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